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While the means of payment in takeovers has been a focal point in the takeover literature, what has largely been ignored is 
the analysis of how the takeover bid is financed and what its impact is on the expected value creation of the takeover. This 
paper investigates the sources of transaction financing in European corporate takeovers launched during the period 1993-
2001 (the fifth takeover wave). Using a unique dataset, we show that the external sources of financing (debt and equity) are 
frequently employed in takeovers involving cash payments. Acquisitions with the same means of payment but different 
sources of transaction funding are quite distinct. For instance, a significantly negative price revision following the 
announcement of a takeover is not unique to the equity-paid M&As; it is also observed in any other deals that involve equity 
financing (including cash-paid and mixed-paid M&As). Also, acquisitions financed with internally generated funds 
significantly underperform those financed with debt. Our multinomial logit and nested logit analyses show that the takeover 
financing decision is influenced by the bidder’s pecking order preferences, its growth potential, and its corporate governance 
environment, all of which are related to the cost of external capital. There is also evidence that the choice of equity versus 
internal cash or debt financing is influenced by the bidder’s strategic preferences with respect to the means of payment. We 
find no evidence of financing decisions driven by agency conflicts between managers and shareholders or between 
shareholders and creditors.  
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The empirical literature has given notable attention in recent years to the choice of the means of payment 
in corporate takeovers (see e.g. Travlos, 1987; Amihud et al., 1990; Martin, 1996; Ghosh and Ruland, 1998; and 
Faccio and Masulis, 2005). In this literature, the term ‘means of payment’ is usually considered as synonymous to 
the ‘sources of takeover financing’. This error is particularly severe for all-cash offers which are assumed to be 
entirely financed with cash. As external sources of funds (debt and equity) are frequently used to finance all-cash 
offers, the means of payment is no longer an appropriate proxy for the sources of transaction financing in 
corporate takeovers. Therefore, the analysis of the motives underlying the means of payment may lead to incorrect 
conclusions about the validity of the theories that explain the firm’s financing decision (such as Myers, 1977; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers and Majluf, 1984).  
This paper contributes to the takeover literature by explicitly investigating the motives underlying the 
bidder’s decision on how to finance a takeover bid. By classifying takeovers by their sources of financing (rather 
than by their means of payment), we test the predictions derived from the dominant theories of how companies 
choose the financing sources for their investment projects. This is a novel way to test whether the bidder’s 
financing decision is driven by the following explanations: pecking order and market timing (Myers and Majluf, 
1984), regulatory environment (La Porta et al., 1997), debt overhang (Myers, 1977), takeover threat (Zwiebel, 
1996), or the agency costs of equity and debt (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). As the choice of the funding may 
depend on the means of payment offered in the takeover, we also relate the financing decision to the bidder’s 
preferences for a specific payment method. Specifically, we consider how the choice of sources of funding of 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and the means of payment is affected by the bidders’ concerns with respect to 
the risk of overpayment for the target (Hansen, 1987), the risk of a change in the firm’s control structure (Faccio 
and Masulis, 2005), and the risk of a bid’s failure (Fishman, 1989). As the bidders’ choice of the sources of 
funding may convey additional information to the market about the quality of the firm and the profitability of the 
takeover, we further complement our analysis with evidence of the valuation effect of takeovers financed with 
different types of capital.  
To our best knowledge, this is the first empirical study that models the sources of financing along with the 
means of payment used in corporate takeovers.1 The lack of reliable data on the sources of takeover financing 
may have been the main reason why the financing decision of the bidding firms has never been investigated 
before. Our analysis is based on a unique hand-collected dataset of European takeover bids that were launched 
during the fifth takeover wave (1993-2001).2  
                                                 
1 Schlingemann’s (2004) study is related but differs significantly from our paper for the following reasons: (i) it focuses on 
the ex ante ability of a bidder to finance an M&A with cash, debt, or equity and hence not the actual financing of the 
transaction, (ii) it does not model the payment/financing choice but examines the impact of the possible transaction 
financing on the bidders’ announcement abnormal returns, and (iii) it examines cash-paid M&As only.  
2 The 1990s takeover wave occurred in the US, Europe and to some extent in Asia, and is often labelled the ‘fifth’ takeover 
wave. This wave picked up in the early 1990s and collapsed mid 2000 with the abrupt decline of the stock markets 
following the bursting of the internet/high tech bubble. Strictly speaking, the numbering of the takeover waves refers to the 
US because prior to the 1960s, M&A activity in other regions was either modest or quality data are missing. For an 
overview of the takeover waves, see Martynova and Renneboog (2008d). 
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We document that external sources of financing (debt and equity issues) are frequently employed in 
takeovers that involve cash and mixed payments. In more than 850 acquisitions entirely paid with cash, one-third 
is at least partially financed with external funds (70% of which are financed with debt). Of the 260 firms opting to 
make an offer consisting of a combination of equity and cash, 37% borrow to finance the cash component of the 
takeover offer.  
Our main findings are that the financing decision (the bidder’s choice between cash, debt, and equity 
financing) is explained by pecking order preferences, the need of flexibility in managing corporate funds, and the 
corporate governance environment that influences the costs of external capital. We find no evidence that the 
financing decision is driven by potential agency conflicts between managers and shareholders, or between 
shareholders and creditors. There is evidence that the choice of equity versus internal cash or debt financing is 
influenced by the bidder’s strategic preferences with respect to the means of payment. A nested logit analysis 
reveals that the payment decision depends on the degree to which the bidder’s large shareholders wish to retain 
control after the takeover, and on the intention of the bidder’s shareholders to share the risk of the transaction with 
the target’s shareholders or to buy all these shareholders out. These factors do not directly influence the financing 
decision, but only indirectly through the means of payment choice. Therefore, we conclude that the two decisions 
on the means of payment and on the sources of financing in corporate takeovers are driven by distinct 
determinants. 
The analysis of the valuation effect of takeovers that are financed with different sources reveals that 
investors differentiate between the information about the payment method and the sources of takeover financing. 
These investors do take both the payment method and financing sources into account when valuing a takeover. A 
significantly negative price revision following the announcement of a takeover frequently arises in case of M&As 
fully paid with equity but also of takeovers that involve equity financing (including cash-paid and mixed-paid 
M&As). We also find that acquisitions financed with internally generated funds underperform debt-financed 
deals, suggesting that investors are wary that cash-financed deals may be driven by managerial empire building 
motives. In contrast, debt financing conveys a positive signal to the market that the firm’s shares may not be 
overvalued and that the takeover is profitable (and generates a tax shield). Thus, the bidder’s financing decision 
has a significant impact on the market reaction to the takeover announcement. Our evidence shows that previous 
research that partitioned takeover bids into cash versus equity offers is an oversimplification of the reality. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate the hypotheses on what 
drives the bidder’s choice of how to finance the takeover. We also derive predictions for the valuation effect of 
takeovers financed with different types of capital. Section 3 describes the sample selection procedure, data 
sources, and sample statistics. Section 4 discusses the methodology. In section 5, we present and interpret our 
empirical findings. Section 6 reports the results of the robustness check and section 7 concludes.  
 
2. MOTIVATION AND HYPOTHESES 
 
A prominent view in the corporate finance literature is that equity issues reduce firm value. Indeed, share 
price reductions arise when equity is used as a means of payment in M&As (see e.g. Moeller et al, 2004; Andrade 
et al., 2001; Franks et al., 1991) or when seasoned equity offerings are made (see e.g. Asquith and Mullins, 1986; 
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Masulis and Korwar, 1986; Mikkelson and Parch, 1986). In spite of the negative price reactions, financing 
investment activities with equity issues has been a common phenomenon over the past two decades. Corporate 
takeovers present a unique setting to investigate empirically why companies opt for equity financing despite its 
negative impact on firm value. Recent empirical evidence shows that equity has become an increasingly popular 
source of financing in M&As (see Andrade et al, 2001; Martynova and Renneboog, 2006 and 2008d). Our 
analysis enables us to test whether the choice of the sources of financing depends on a wide range of bidder 
characteristics (such as cash flow, debt capacity, corporate governance regime, and growth opportunities), and 
whether it is also influenced by the characteristics of the investment project (the takeover).  
We divide our analysis into two parts. First, we investigate the determinants of the financing decision. 
Section 2.1 reviews the predictions from existing theoretical and empirical literature with respect to the factors 
that are expected to shape the corporate preferences for a specific source of financing: internal funds, debt, equity 
or a mix of these sources. Second, we investigate whether the choice of the sources of takeover financing is 
relevant to the bidding firm’s value. Section 2.2 derives the hypotheses with respect to the market reaction to the 
announcement of takeovers financed with different sources.  
 
2.1 The determinants of the financing decision 
 
An extensive body of theoretical and empirical research on the determinants of corporate financing 
decisions can be partitioned into two dominant explanations: cost of capital considerations and agency-related 
issues. The former explanation upholds that market imperfections or institutional rigidities, such as information 
asymmetries (Myers and Majluf, 1984), legal protection of shareholders and creditors (La Porta et al., 1998), or 
taxes (Modigliani and Miller, 1963) may disproportionally affect the costs of debt and equity capital. The latter 
explanation endorses that a firm issues specific securities to mitigate agency problems between its management, 
shareholders, and creditors (Myers, 1977; Zwiebel, 1996). For the financing decision in corporate takeovers in 
particular, we propose a third explanation: the preferred payment mode in the takeover deal may influence the 
financing sources chosen by the bidding firm. In the remainder of this section, we formulate the hypotheses on 
how the bidder’s choice of the sources of takeover financing depends on the cost of capital considerations (section 
2.1.1), agency problems (section 2.1.2), and on the preferences for specific payment methods in the takeover deal 
(section 2.1.3).  
 
2.1.1 Cost of Capital considerations (CC) 
 
Pecking Order and Market Timing:  
The negative price reaction to the announcement of equity issues is typically ascribed to asymmetric 
information. Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that investors consider an equity issue as a signal that a firm is 
overvalued. This adverse price effect of an equity issue increases its costs and forces firms to issue equity only 
when alternative sources of financing are unavailable or too costly. However, the value reduction induced by 
equity issues may be less severe in periods of stock market booms. Not only do buoyant equity markets overvalue 
shares in the short-run (hence making equity a relatively cheap source of financing), they also induce investors to 
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under-react to negative signals about the firms’ fundamental values (Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler, 2004).3 When 
contracting debt is no longer advantageous compared to issuing equity, firms are more likely to raise money for 
takeovers by performing seasoned equity issues (Choe, Masulis, and Nanda, 1993).4 Consequently, we formulate 
the following predictions (CC1):  
CC1(a) Equity financing of takeovers is more likely when a firm has insufficient cash funds and limited debt 
capacity to finance takeovers. A debt issue has priority over an equity issue and is more likely when 
firms are cash-constrained but still have sufficient debt capacity.  
CC1(b) Equity financing of takeovers  is more likely when the bidding firm experiences a significant increase in 
its share price, especially in periods of stock market booms. 
 
Our measure of insufficient cash funds (i.e. an internal funding deficit) is the bidder’s internally generated 
funds and cash surpluses divided by the transaction value (CFLOW/TRANSVAL and CHLDG/TRANSVAL 
respectively). A ratio less than one denotes that the bidder’s internal sources of funds are insufficient to finance 
the acquisition entirely with cash. Two variables are used as proxies for the bidder’s debt capacity: 
COLLATERAL is the percentage of tangible assets to total assets of the combined firm (sum of tangible assets of 
the bidding and target firms over sum of total assets of the two firms). As tangible assets can represent collateral 
for creditors, we expect firms with a higher percentage of tangibles to attract debt financing more easily (Myers, 
1977; Hovakimian et al., 2001). The second variable, FIN LEVERAGE, is calculated as the sum of the bidder’s 
long-term debt and the transaction value, divided by the sum of the bidder’s book value of assets and the 
transaction value. All the variables mentioned above are calculated at the year-end prior to the deal 
announcement. Our measure of the bidder’s share price performance prior to the bid consists of the daily 
abnormal returns realized over the window starting 60 days and ending 20 days prior to the bid announcement 
(RUNUP). To control for stock market performance, we construct indicator variables for the periods 1993-1996 
(stock market recovery), 1997-1999 (stock market boom), and 2000-2001 (stock market decline).    
      
Regulatory Environment: 
A growing literature advocates that regulation is a key determinant of corporate financing decisions. La 
Porta et al. (1997, 1998), Levine (1999), Djankov et al. (2004) argue that regulation affects the terms at which 
financiers are willing to provide firms with funds. Martynova and Renneboog (2008c) give evidence of spill-over 
effects of corporate governance standards in cross-border acquisitions. When a regulatory environment protects 
the providers of funds against expropriation by corporate management, external finance may be available at lower 
costs. Specifically, strong creditor protection assumes that lenders can more easily force repayment, take 
possession of collateral, or even gain control over the firm. This results in lower creditor risks and hence in lower 
costs of borrowing. Consequently, borrowing becomes relatively more attractive. Similarly, strong shareholder 
                                                 
3 The overvaluation of a bidding firm’s equity may also have an important bearing on the choice between cash or equity 
payments (and hence the financing) in a takeover bid. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and Vishwanathan 
(2003) show that overvalued bidders use equity to buy real assets of undervalued (or less overvalued) targets. This way 
they hope to take advantage of the mispricing premium over the longer term when the overvaluation may be corrected. 
4 In line with this argument, the empirical evidence documents that an improvement in the stock market and the overall 
economic activity boosts IPOs and SEO issues (see e.g. Marsh, 1982; Choe et al., 1993; Lowry and Schwert, 2002). 
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protection increases the relative attractiveness of equity financing. Better protection by law enables shareholders 
to reduce the risks of their investments by participating in or monitoring corporate decision-making. These 
reduced risks imply a lower cost of equity. In addition, a bidder is more likely to issue equity in countries with 
higher corporate disclosure standards, as the adverse effects of equity issues are less severe when corporate 
activities are more transparent. Overall, as the financing choice depends on the relative magnitude of the costs 
associated with debt and equity issues, we hypothesize that: 
CC2(a): Firms are more likely to use debt financing in countries where the costs of issuing equity are 
substantially higher due to poor shareholder protection or where the costs of borrowing are relatively 
lower due to better creditor protection.  
CC2(b): The use of equity financing is more likely in countries with higher transparency standards. 
 
We measure the differences in the regulatory corporate governance environment (shareholder and creditor 
protection, and transparency standards) across European countries with corporate governance indices developed 
by Martynova and Renneboog (2008b). The creditor protection index (CREDITOR PRT) measures the degree to 
which national bankruptcy and reorganization laws protect the interests of creditors from being dismissed by 
managers acting in their own or the shareholders’ interests. The shareholder rights protection index (SHAREHDR 
PRT) quantifies the regulatory provisions that aim at mitigating managerial opportunistic behaviour with respect 
to the shareholders. A higher index score signifies a higher likelihood that the management acts in the interest of 
shareholders. The transparency index (TRANSPARANCY) is based on the quality of information available about 
the company and the management. This index reflects the degree to which the market is informed about corporate 
policies and the contracts directly related to the management, as well as about the frequency with which this 
information is released.  
La Porta et al. (1998) argue that a system of strong legal enforcement may substitute for weaker 
regulation, as well-functioning courts can effectively resolve disputes between corporate constituencies. 
Conversely, laws designed to uphold the rights of shareholders may be eroded in case the judiciary does not 
function effectively. To capture such issues, we multiply our indices by an index representing the quality of law 
enforcement. We use two proxies for the law enforcement index: the rule of law index (RULE OF LAW) and the 
corruption index (CORRUPT), both developed by the World Bank5. The rule of law index measures the extent to 
which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, which include the effectiveness and 
predictability of the judiciary and the enforceability of contracts. The corruption index measures the extent to 
which one can exercise public power for private gain. Corruption is usually associated with a lack of respect for 
the rules of society, and hence represents a failure of the judicial system to enforce the law. A higher score of each 
index indicates that a national judicial system is more effective.6  
 
2.1.2 Agency Problems between corporate claimants (AG) 
 
                                                 
5 More information on the indices is available at http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/ 
6 The World Bank indices on legal enforcement and corruption are available since 1996. For the years prior to 1996, we 
assume that the quality of law enforcement environment was similar to that of 1996. Therefore, the missing values of the 
rule of law and corruption indices for years 1993-1995 are proxied by the value of the corresponding indices in 1996. 
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Agency Costs of Equity and Takeover Threats: 
For managers who pursue a personal agenda at the expense of shareholders’ wealth, a debt issue may be 
regarded as the least preferred source of financing as it restricts the availability of corporate funds at their disposal 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In contrast, an equity issue increases the funds under managerial discretion and 
hence may be strictly preferred by the manager. This agency conflict between the management and shareholders 
is most pronounced in widely-held corporations where shareholder activism and efficient monitoring of the 
management may be lower. Therefore, we predict that: 
AG1(a): Firms with a diffuse ownership structure are more likely to issue equity to finance takeovers. 
 
As dispersed (atomistic) shareholders have few incentives to monitor their management directly, they rely 
on external monitoring by the market for corporate control. Zwiebel (1996) shows that entrenched managers may 
voluntarily opt for debt financing because of the takeover threat from the market for corporate control. In his 
dynamic model, hostile takeovers target poorly performing firms and replace their management. The threat of 
losing their jobs and perquisites provides managers with an incentive to focus on the shareholder value 
maximization, and a debt issue allows them to constrain credibly their discretion over corporate funds. Therefore, 
we expect that:  
AG1(b): Managers anticipating a takeover threat are more likely to finance acquisitions with debt. 
 
We employ two variables to measure the dispersion of the bidder’s corporate control structure. First, 
CONTROL (%) is the ultimate voting stake owned by the bidder’s largest shareholder. The second variable, 
BLOCKHDR>20, is a binary variable indicating the presence of a blockholder owning a voting stake of at least 
20%. Following Faccio and Lang (2002), we assume that that 20% of the voting shares suffices to ensure control.7 
If no shareholder exceeds the threshold, we consider the company to be widely held. The measure of the bidder’s 
takeover vulnerability, TO THREAT, is the likelihood that the bidder is a target of a corporate takeover in the 
year preceding its acquisition. It is estimated by a probit model applied to all European firms for the period 1993-
2001.8 
   
Debt Overhang: 
Myers (1977) argues that the conflicting interests of shareholders and creditors may encourage firms to 
issue equity rather than debt to raise external funds. In his view, the wealth-maximizing preferences of 
shareholders dictate that managers undertake a project only if its expected benefits exceed the payments to 
debtholders. This may lead to underinvestment as managers may forego positive NPV investment projects if the 
expected benefits only suffice to repay debt and leave no or little return to the shareholders. To minimize the 
                                                 
7 We also consider alternative control thresholds of 10% and 15%. However this does not materially change the results of our 
regression analysis. We discuss this in more details in section 6 (robustness checks). 
8 The sample of European firms for the period 1993-2001 is an unbalanced panel. The dependent variable in the probit model 
equals one if the company was acquired during the year and is zero otherwise. The set of independent variables is taken 
from the prior literature explaining the probability of takeovers (Hasbrouck, 1985; Palepu, 1986; Ambrose and Megginson, 
1992; Cremers et al., 2005). The estimated parameters of the model are available upon request. 
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scope of underinvestment, firms with high quality projects may limit leverage and hence avoid further borrowing. 
This leads us to the following prediction:  
AG2: Firms with high growth potential are more likely to issue equity to finance acquisitions. 
 
Our main measure of the bidder’s growth potential is Tobin’s Q, calculated as the bidder’s market value 
of equity (ordinary and preferred) plus the book value of long-term debt divided by the sum of the book values of 
equity and long-term debt. Other measures considered are the average growth rate in sales (SALES 3YGR), in 
capital expenditures (CAPX 3YGR), and in total assets (TA 3YGR) over the 3 years prior to the year of the 
acquisition.9 Detailed definitions are given in Appendix I.  
 
Agency Cost of Debt and Financial Flexibility: 
In addition to the underinvestment problem, conflicts of interests between shareholders and creditors may 
also lead to another agency problem; namely, excessive risk taking by the management. Black and Scholes (1973) 
show that the equity of a leveraged firm is a call option on the firm’s assets whose value increases with the 
volatility of future cash flows. This implies that the management can maximize shareholder wealth by increasing 
the risk of the projects it invests in, and hence re-distribute wealth from bondholders to shareholders. Higher 
earnings volatility increases the expected bankruptcy costs which creditors may anticipate by demanding better 
terms in the debt covenants. Consequently, the cost of borrowing increases, which makes debt financing less 
attractive or even prohibitively expensive for leveraged and risky firms. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
AG3(a): Highly leveraged firms with high volatility are less likely to use debt financing. 
 
Bolton and Freixas (2000) formulate an alternative theory. In their capital market equilibrium, risky firms 
prefer bank loans to equity financing because banks are good at helping firms through times of financial distress. 
That is, firms facing a high risk of bankruptcy are more likely to establish close lending relationships with banks. 
This provides them with access to the cheapest form of flexible financing. Safer firms prefer to issue equity (and 
bonds) and hence avoid paying the intermediation cost associated with bank loans. Whereas Bolton and Freixas 
(2000) distinguish between debt financing in the form of a bank loan and a bond issue, we are unable to follow 
this classification due to the data limitations described in Section 3.1. However, we can test the predictions of 
their model on the firm’s preference between equity and debt financing in the form of bank loans for the 
following two reasons. First, the European market for corporate bonds is small (relative to that of the US). 
Furthermore, most of the debt financing consists of bank loans (common in e.g. Germany) or of private 
placements of loan notes (common in the UK).10 Second, in terms of the firm’s ability to renegotiate debt 
contracts in the times of financial distress, privately issued loan notes (which are also frequently unsecured) are 
more similar to bank loans than to publicly issued bonds. The reason is that public debt is difficult to renegotiate 
due to coordination problems between small creditors (bondholders), whereas private debt (privately issued loan 
                                                 
9 The advantage of these growth measures is that they are not affected by differences in accounting policies across firms 
(countries), while their disadvantage is that, in contrast to Tobin’s Q, they are not forward-looking. 
10 Renneboog and Szilagyi (2007) document that out of all European M&As that took place from 1996-2004, only 225 deals 
involve bidding firms with publicly traded Eurobonds. (They only study the Eurobond market as this is the largest 
European bond market and the only one with a sufficiently liquid secondary market.)    
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notes) – just like bank loans - frequently involves only one or a group of large creditors. Therefore, following the 
predictions of Bolton and Freixas (2000), we hypothesize that:  
AG3(b) Firms with high volatility are more likely to choose debt financing in takeover deals. 
AG3(c) Young risky firms are more likely to use equity financing in takeover transactions.   
 
To proxy for the firm’s risk, we employ the age of the bidding firm (AGE) and its exposure to the market 
risk (BETA) estimated by means of the market model over the period between 300 and 60 days prior to the 
takeover announcement. We expect the shares of relatively young firms and firms with high betas to be more 
risky.  
 
2.1.3 Means of Payment considerations (MP) 
 
As the bidder’s decision regarding the sources of takeover financing often coincides with or depends on 
the choice of the payment mode in the takeover deal, we complement our above analysis with the reasons why 
bidders prefer specific means of payment in corporate takeovers.   
 
Risk Sharing: 
Information asymmetries between bidder and target are an important determinant of the means of 
payment in corporate acquisitions. In particular, high uncertainty about the true value of the target firm induces 
the bidder to pay with its own equity rather than cash. Capital participation in the combined firm makes the target 
shareholders share the risk of potential downward revaluations after the bid’s completion. Hansen (1987) predicts 
that misvaluation of the target firm is especially harmful when the transaction value is high and the size of the 
target’s assets is large relative to that of the bidder’s assets. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
MP1: The probability that an equity offer is made increases with the absolute and relative transaction value.  
 
To test the risk-sharing hypothesis, we employ three variables: the market value of the bidding firm 
(MVAL) measured 60 days prior to the bid announcement, the transaction value (TRANSVAL) measured by the 
total amount the bidder pays to purchase shares of the target firm (excluding assumed liabilities), and the relative 
size of the transaction (RELVAL) calculated as the transaction value divided by the sum of the transaction value 
and the bidder’s market capitalization.  
 
The Threat of Control Change: 
Faccio and Masulis (2005) document that a change in the corporate control structure – for instance, by 
means of voting power dilution or the emergence of an outside blockholder - may discourage bidders from paying 
for the acquisition with equity. These findings support the theories by Harris and Raviv (1988) and Stulz (1988) 
who predict that an equity exchange is less likely to be used when an equity issue dilutes the voting power of the 
blockholders or share-owning managers of the acquiring firm. Thus, the likelihood of an equity payment is here 
largely determined by the control structures of the bidding and target firms. In particular, a cash payment is 
strictly preferred to an equity payment when the target’s share ownership is concentrated and a bidder’s largest 
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blockholder only holds an intermediate level of voting power. This preference is weakened if the target company 
is widely held or if the bidder’s dominant shareholder has a supermajority of voting rights. We formulate the 
threat of control change-hypothesis as follows:   
MP2: A bidder is unlikely to offer an equity payment which significantly changes the bidder’s degree of 
control in the combined firm. 
 
To capture the impact of an all-equity offer on the control structure of the bidding firm, we consider the 
following four variables. CONTROL THREAT is the voting stake in the combined firm that the largest 
shareholder of the target firm would obtain provided the acquisition is entirely paid with equity. An all-equity bid 
may create a new large shareholder in the merged firm which could threaten the control positions of the bidder’s 
incumbent blockholders. To measure the vulnerability of the bidder’s incumbent blockholder with respect to a 
potential control loss, we employ three indicator variables characterizing the bidder’s control structure. Following 
Faccio and Masulis (2005), we distinguish between widely-held companies (in which no blockholders hold at 
least 20% of voting rights; CONTROL<20), companies with intermediate control concentration (in which the 
largest blockholder owns a voting stake between 20% and 60%; 20<CONTROL<60), and firms controlled by a 
blockholder holding a strong majority of voting rights (CONTROL>60).11 The bidder’s control structure is 
affected by an all-equity offer if the firm is widely held or is controlled by a shareholder with an intermediate 
level of voting power.  
 
Characteristics of the takeover bid: 
Some characteristics of the takeover offer may also affect the choice of the payment method. First, an 
equity payment is less likely to be offered in cross-border takeovers. The target shareholders may be reluctant to 
accept an equity offer from a foreign acquirer if the latter’s shares are not traded in the seller’s country. This could 
entail that the bidding firm(‘s quality) may be less known in the target’s country (see e.g. French and Poterba, 
1991; Coval and Moskowitz, 1999). Also, the regulation in the target’s country may impose restrictions on 
foreign equity investments (Faccio and Masulis, 2005; Goergen, Martynova and Renneboog, 2005). Second, cash 
offers increase the probability of the bid’s success in tender offers, mandatory bids, competing bids, and hostile 
takeovers, and are hence preferred by bidders in such types of transactions (Fishman, 1989). Third, the incumbent 
owners of an unlisted target are more likely to accept a cash payment, as their primary incentive to sell the firm is 
frequently to cash out. Therefore, equity bids are also least likely when the target firm is unlisted or closely-held. 
In sum, we expect that:  
MP3: An equity payment is less likely in tender offers, hostile takeovers, cross-border acquisitions, and 
acquisitions of unlisted targets. 
 
                                                 
11 Following Faccio and Masulis (2005), we consider voting stakes in the range of 20 to 60 percent as an intermediate level of 
voting power. This is the range where the control position of the large shareholder is most vulnerable to being diluted by an 
equity offer. Alternative specifications are considered in the robustness checks section (Section 6). 
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To test this prediction we construct four binary variables, TENDER OFFER, HOSTILE BID, 
CROSSBORDER BID, and LISTED TARGET, which take the value of one if the takeover transaction has the 
corresponding characteristic. 
 
2.2 Valuation effects of the bidder’s financing decision 
 
An M&A announcement brings new (unexpected) information to the market which enables investors to 
update their expectations about the firm’s prospects and adjust the share prices accordingly. Value-relevant 
takeover information also comprises various takeover characteristics (the form of the bid, the attitude of the 
target’s board towards the bid, cross-border expansion, the means of payment, industry-relatedness, etc.) as well 
as the sources of financing.12 The market combines these pieces of information into a signal about the quality of 
the takeover deal and the potential value creation. As such, the announcement effect consists of an appraisal of the 
takeover synergies based on the characteristics of the deal. Below, we summarize the predictions with regard to 
the market reactions to the announcements of takeovers financed with different types of capital.  
Takeovers financed with equity are expected to trigger lower returns to the bidder’s shareholders. The 
dominant explanation is that investors consider an equity issue as a signal that the bidder’s shares are overpriced 
and hence adjust the share price downwards when equity financing is announced (Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
Managers attempt to time equity issues to coincide with surging stock markets or even with the peak of the stock 
market cycle (Baker et al., 2004). This overvaluation argument may be more pronounced for M&As entirely 
financed and paid with equity. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and Vishwanathan (2003) argue that 
overvalued bidders use equity to buy real assets of undervalued (or less overvalued) targets to take advantage of 
the mispricing premium over the longer term when the overvaluation will be corrected. An equity payment (which 
is not necessarily the same as equity financing) may also be interpreted by the market as a negative signal about 
uncertainty with respect to the target firm’s quality and potential takeover synergies. If the quality of the acquired 
assets is more uncertain, the bidder is likely to pay with equity to share with the target’s shareholders the risks of 
not being able to realize the expected synergies. Empirical evidence confirms the negative market reaction to 
M&As paid with equity (see e.g. Moeller et al, 2004; Andrade et al., 2001; Martynova and Renneboog, 2008a).  
In contrast to equity financing, the announcement of debt financing is expected to trigger a positive 
market reaction. First, the preference of debt over equity financing signals that the bidder’s shares may not be 
overvalued. When internal sources of financing are insufficient the manager opts for debt financing if the shares 
of the firm are undervalued or there is a high risk that an equity issue will trigger a substantial share price decline. 
Second, as debt capital is typically raised in Europe via borrowing from a bank, the bank’s decision to provide 
funding may convey a positive signal about the project’s profitability to the market. Banks are typically regarded 
as financial intermediaries with superior information and evaluation capabilities (Leland and Pyle, 1977; 
Diamond, 1984) that allows them to identify bad acquisitions and fund only deals with a positive net present 
value. Therefore, the market may interpret the news about debt financing as a certification that a takeover will be 
profitable. Evidence of the banks’ certification role is reported by Lummer and McConnell (1989) and Billett et 
al. (1995) who find that the market reacts positively when firms announce bank loans. In the context of corporate 
                                                 
12 For an overview of the determinants of takeover returns see Martynova and Renneboog (2008d). 
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takeovers, Bharadwaj and Shivdasani (2003) also document positive market response to the announcements of 
bank-funded deals. Third, the choice of debt financing also signals that the cash flows of the merged firm will be 
sufficient to sustain an additional tax shield. 
The use of the third source of financing, internally generated funds, is likely to trigger a negative market 
reaction at the takeover announcement as this type of financing may identify acquisitions driven by free cash flow 
motives (Jensen, 1986). High cash flow reserves may encourage management to undertake acquisitions for empire 
building motives, which frequently lead to a reduction of shareholder value. Consistent with these predictions, 
Lang et al. (1991) and Schlingemann (2004) find a negative and significant relation between internally generated 
cash flow reserves and bidder returns in cash-paid M&As.  
 
3. SAMPLE SELECTION, DATA SOURCES, AND SAMPLE DESCRIPTION 
 
The study explores a unique dataset compiled from more than 10 different databases. In this section, we 
describe the sample selection procedure and the data sources. We also provide an overview of the sample 
composition by sources of transaction financing and by means of payment.  
 
3.1 Sample selection and data sources 
 
We build our initial sample of European acquisitions performed between 1993 and 2001 – during the fifth 
takeover wave - from the Mergers and Acquisitions Database of the Securities Data Company (SDC). We focus 
on European domestic takeovers and intra-European cross-border acquisitions with both acquirer and target 
located in Continental Europe or the UK. M&As involving firms from Central and Eastern Europe are also 
considered. The deals included in the sample fulfil the following requirements: (i) the takeover aims at acquiring 
majority control; (ii) both parties in the transaction are independent corporations (divestitures and management 
buyouts are not included); (iii) neither the bidder nor the target is a financial institution (M&As involving banks, 
unit trusts, mutual funds, and pension funds are excluded); (iv) the bidder’s shares are traded on a European stock 
exchange (but the target firm can be either listed or in private hands); (v) the period between two consecutive bids 
by the same acquirer is no less than 300 trading days;13 (vi) financial and accounting data for at least one of the 
participants of the transaction is available from DataStream, and the Amadeus, Fame, and Reach databases; (vii) 
the ownership and control structures of bidding and target companies one year prior to the acquisition can be 
identified; and (viii) information on the sources of takeover financing is found. A total of 1,361 completed M&As 
involving firms from 26 European countries satisfy these criteria. 
The quality of the SDC data is verified by comparing its information on the announcement date, the 
bidding and target companies’ country of origin, the transaction value, the payment structure, the control stake 
acquired, the bid completion status, and the target’s attitude towards the bid, with information from the news 
                                                 
13 The reason is that we want to avoid contamination of the periods used to estimate the systematic risk. Therefore, we 
excluded bids by the same acquirer within less than 300 trading days from the previous announcement (240 days 
estimation period starting 60 days before the event). 
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announcements stored in LexisNexis, the Financial Times, and Factiva.14 We find that the SDC records for M&As 
from our sample frequently do not coincide with those of the other sources. These inconsistencies have been 
double checked and amended. Amendments to SDC records were made in about 36% of the deals included in our 
final sample.15   
The ownership and control structures of the bidding and target firms prior to the takeover announcement 
are collected from a variety of sources described in Appendix II. To control for dual class shares, pyramidal 
ownership structures, multiple control chains, and cross-holdings, all of which prevail in Continental European 
companies, we focus on the corporate control composition rather than on the ownership structures. To identify the 
ultimate control structure of a firm, we follow the methodology presented in Renneboog (2000), Faccio and Lang 
(2002), and Köke and Renneboog (2005). First, we consider only shares bearing voting rights. Second, as control 
depends on both direct and indirect ownership of voting equity, we accumulate the voting stakes that are directly 
or indirectly controlled by the same ultimate shareholder. When a target company is private, we assume that the 
control concentration in that firm amounts to 100%. 
Three data sources are used to identify how bidders finance their takeovers. The main source is the news 
announcements from LexisNexis, the Financial Times, and Factiva. We find that in addition to the information on 
the means of payment, the news announcements also frequently report on the sources of financing in acquisitions. 
For instance, this announcement shows that a deal is entirely financed by debt: “PARIS (AP-Dow Jones) -- 
French company Axa-UAP said Friday it sold its stake in company Finextel to Sophia for FF458 million. […] 
Standard & Poor's considers that this operation, completely financed by debt, involve a deterioration of the 
capitalization of Sophia.” 
While extracting financing information from all news announcements surrounding the takeover bid 
doubtlessly enables us to relate the financing decision and the takeover, most news announcements do not 
disclose a very detailed description of the financing arrangement. Consequently, we are able to identify how the 
bidding firm finances the deal (with internal funds, a debt issue, and/or an equity issue) but are unable to 
distinguish whether debt financing takes place by means of a bank credit or a loan notes/bond issue, or whether 
equity financing occurs in the form of a public or private equity placement. Furthermore, when two or more 
financing sources were used, the exact proportion of the sources is frequently not released. We therefore partition 
the financing sources into the following categories: (i) internal funds only, (ii) equity issues, (iii) debt issues, and 
(iv) a combination of equity and debt issues. Since financing with internally generated funds is at least partially 
used in almost all M&As, we only differentiate between those transactions which are fully financed by internally 
generated cash (the first category) and those which also involve sources of financing other than internal funds (the 
last three categories). 
It is important to note that we focus on the ultimate financing (and payment) structure of the bid. That is, 
when the bidder offers the target’s shareholders a choice between various payment alternatives (cash, equity, or a 
                                                 
14 We consider all news announcements available in English, French, German, Dutch, Italian, Spanish, Swedish, Portuguese, 
Russian, Czech, and Polish. For the announcements in languages that we do not master at least passively (Portuguese, 
Spanish, Swedish and Italian), we have used the WorldLingo online translator (www.worldlingo.com).  
15 The percentage refers to all M&As from our sample for which at least one deal characteristic reported in SDC does not 
coincide with that from the other sources. Most of the inaccuracies found in the SDC records regard the control stake 
acquired, the bid completion status, and the transaction value.  
 14 
combination) which require different sources of financing, we search for the news announcements that refer to the 
final outcome of the offer in terms of the financing sources and means of payment.16 Although the final outcome 
of the offer may be affected by preferences of the target’s shareholders, for the bid to succeed the bidder must also 
be satisfied with the financial structure of the deal. Therefore, the ultimate financing (and payment) structure of 
the takeover must be within the range of the bidder’s preferences. The bidder is able to influence the target’s 
shareholders choice by making his preferred payment (and financing) alternative more attractive for them. For 
instance, if the bidder prefers the target’s shareholders to accept the equity offer rather than the cash offer, the 
latter will be discounted by several percentage points. Consequently, the ultimate terms of the deal are expected to 
be in line with the initial bidder’s preferences.  
While the news announcements are our main source of information on how bidders finance their 
takeovers, we also explore other sources of information. First, for a sub-sample of 50 bidding firms, we study 
annual reports, prospectuses, and circulation letters available through Thomson Financial Research.17 We cross-
check the takeover financing information collected from the financial reports with the one extracted from the 
news announcements. We find that the information from the two data sources virtually always coincides, which 
implies that news announcements are a reliable information source in this respect.  
Second, we consult the Thomson Financial SDC New Issues database and search for public offerings of 
debt and equity by each bidding firm. We assume that a security issue with the aim of financing an M&A 
transaction takes place in the period around the first public announcement of the takeover.18 In most cases, it is 
rather straightforward to identify the security issues made in connection with M&As, as the database records that 
our sample firms infrequently opt to issue public securities. However, the limitation of this database is that it does 
not cover bank loans, which is an important source of financing in Continental Europe. Also, the comparison of 
information collected from the news announcements and the one from the SDC New Issues database reveals that 
the database coverage of debt and equity issues by Continental European firms is rather incomplete. For these 
reasons, we include the financing information from the Thomson Financial SDC New Issues database only when 
information from the other sources (like news announcements) is not available. Also, as a robustness check, we 
estimate our models with and without data collected from this source. We find no significant differences in the 
results for the two samples.       
    
3.2 Sample description 
 
                                                 
16 For example, the UK City Code obliges firms which make a tender offer to provide the target firm shareholders with a 
choice between different forms of payment: cash, equity, loan notes, or a combination (Goergen and Frecknall-Hughes, 
2007).  
17 Financial reports are available in electronic photocopy format and hence do not allow us to search for keywords, which 
makes data search extremely time consuming. For this reason, we first considered 50 randomly chosen companies with 
financial reports available in order to check for inconsistencies between the information from financial reports and that 
from the news announcements collected earlier. We focus on UK bidders as their financial reports are published in English 
and because electronic translation (with WorldLingo) of the reports published in another language is impossible due to the 
photocopy format of these reports.     
18 We consider all equity and debt issues occurring during the period starting 1 year prior to the bid announcement and ending 
1 month after the bid completion day.  
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As mentioned above, we partition the sources of takeover financing into four general categories: internal 
funds only, equity issues, debt issues, and combinations of equity and debt issues, whereby the last three 
categories may also include the use of some internal funds. We further refine this classification based on the 
means of payment. Financing the takeover with internally generated funds or with debt implies that the 
acquisition is entirely paid with cash.19 In contrast, equity financing may be used in acquisitions fully paid with 
equity, with cash and equity, or entirely with cash.20 A bidding firm may either directly exchange the shares from 
a seasoned equity issue for the shares of the target firm (in all-equity and cash-and-equity offers), or sell its new 
shares and use the proceeds to pay for the acquisition (all-cash payment). When the bidder issues debt and equity, 
it may pay for the target firm’s shares with a combination of cash and equity, or with cash only.21        
Table 1 shows the sample composition by sources of transaction financing and by means of payment for 
each European country. A large part of M&A deals (43.4%) is fully financed with internally generated funds, 
whereas the remainder is at least partially financed with external capital. Internal financing is most frequently 
observed in Central and Eastern European countries (80.8% of all bids in the region), in Italy (78.9%), and in 
Spain (70.6%).  
Equity issues are the second most frequently used source of takeover financing: they are used in 33.7% of 
the deals. The proportion of equity-financed transactions is highest in Sweden (41.9% of all bids), Norway 
(38.5%), the UK (38.0%), and Finland (34.3%). Most of the equity-financed acquisitions (89%) involve a direct 
equity payment to the target shareholders such that only 11% of the deals funded by a seasoned equity issue are 
all-cash offers. The percentage of acquisitions paid entirely with cash among the deals financed with equity is the 
highest in Scandinavia, Central and Eastern Europe, France, and the UK.  
The least popular sources of financing in corporate takeovers are debt or a combination of equity and 
debt: they are used in 12.7% and 10.2% of all the M&A bids respectively. Acquirers incorporated in the 
Netherlands (29.4% of all bids in the country), Switzerland (23.1%), and the UK (17.2%) rely most frequently on 
debt financing. Combinations of equity and debt are not uncommon in Ireland (20.0% of all bids in the country) 
and the UK (15.1%).    
When we make abstraction of the sources of financing and partition our sample only on the basis of the 
means of payment, we observe in Table 1 that a large majority of deals (62.8%) are entirely cash-paid whereas the 
remainder is at least partially paid with equity.22 Out of all the bids involving an equity payment, half are pure 
equity exchange offers. The other half consists of mixed offers that contain on average 53% of cash and 47% of 
equity. With exception of the UK and Ireland, acquirers prefer all-equity payments to the combination of equity 
and cash.  
                                                 
19 Debt-financed acquisitions may also involve payment with loan notes. However, following Faccio and Masulis (2005), we 
assume that a payment with loan notes is equivalent to a cash payment.  In the remainder of this paper, we do not 
differentiate between these two types of payment and refer to both as cash payments. 
20 However, this excludes payments with loan notes, as this type of acquisitions would qualify as a transaction financed with 
a combination of equity and debt.  
21 As stipulated above, we consider a payment by loan notes as a cash payment in order to reduce the number of financing-
payment combinations.  
22 This percentage is lower than the 80% reported for European all-cash M&As in Faccio and Masulis (2005). The difference 
may be driven by the fact that we exclude from our sample the divestitures (acquisitions of subsidiaries) and the cross-
border acquisitions of US targets. These types of takeovers represent a substantial fraction of Faccio and Masulis’ sample 
and are most likely pure cash offers. 
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[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
    
4. METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Empirical models of the financing decision 
 
To examine the factors driving the bidder’s choice of the financing sources, we employ multinomial logit 
and nested logit models. The multinomial logit model assumes that the bidder chooses a source of financing from 
four mutually exclusive (independent) alternatives: cash, debt, debt-and-equity, and equity. The nested logit 
model extends the multinomial logit framework by allowing the bidder to make its financing decision conditional 
on the preferred payment method.  
 
4.1.1 Multinomial logit model of the financing decision 
 
In the multinomial logit framework, we assume that each financing choice j corresponds to the NPV of 
the takeover (net of all direct and indirect costs associated with the use of a particular source of financing) Vj(x), 
where x is a vector of exogenous characteristics of the takeover and of the firms involved, and where j denotes 
one of the four financing alternatives: (i) cash financing (cash-paid/cash-financed deals); (ii) debt financing (cash-
paid/debt-financed deals); (iii) debt-and-equity financing (cash-paid/debt-and-equity financed and mixed-
paid/debt-and-equity-financed deals); and (iv) equity financing (equity-paid/equity-financed, mixed-paid/cash-
and-equity-financed, and cash-paid/equity-financed deals). The bidder chooses alternative j if Vj(x) yields the 
maximum of the four possible values. Hence the probability of the choice j is:  
Prj = Prob (Vj > Vk) for all other k ≠ j. 
The model assumes that the (unobserved) takeover value Vj(x) is a linear function of the observed relevant 
characteristics of the bidder and the target and of the bid itself (x) plus random noise (ε): 
 εβ +′= jj xxV )(   
A key assumption of the multinomial logit model is that the random noise (ε) in the value function is 
independently and identically distributed (iid). This assumption implies that the choices between any two 
alternatives are independent of the others, i.e. that the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property is 
upheld.23 To test for the validity of the IIA assumption with respect to the bidder’s financing decision-making 
process, we apply the Hausman specification test (Hausman and McFadden, 1984). 
Our multinomial logit model includes three binary logit models that are estimated simultaneously. Each 
binary logit predicts a probability of choosing one of the first three alternatives relative to the probability of 
opting for equity financing, which we choose as our benchmark alternative. The vector of explanatory variables x 
                                                 
23 That is, if one of the alternatives is removed from the model, the other alternatives will have a proportional increase in the 
probability of being chosen. 
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Where Prj and Pr0 denote the probabilities that the bidder chooses the alternative j relative to the benchmark 
alternative 0; x is a vector of exogenous, observable characteristics of the bidder, the target, and the bid; βj is a 
vector of unknown regression parameters corresponding to the choice of the alternative j. We set the coefficients 
corresponding to the choice of the equity-financing alternative to zero (that is, β0 = 0). The coefficients from each 
logit model represent the impact of an increase in a specific variable on the relative log-odds ratio.  
 
4.1.2 Nested logit model of the sequential payment-financing decision 
 
Since the financing and payment decisions of the bidder can be modelled as a 2-dimensional choice set 
and the choice of financing sources is likely to be conditioned by the payment method, we investigate the 
robustness of the multinomial logit model’s conclusions with a nested logit framework.24 To specify the nested 
logit model, we partition the bidder’s choice set into two branches: by payment method and by sources of 
transaction financing (as illustrated in Figure 1).25 
In these models, we assume that when the bidder makes a financing choice, he first considers which 
means of payment he should offer in the takeover bid. Only subsequently, he decides on the sources of financing. 
Thus, the model estimates the unconditional probability PrP of opting for a specific payment method P, and the 
conditional probability Prf|P of choosing a specific takeover financing source f (conditional on the chosen means 
of payment P). The unconditional probability of the financing/payment choice j which includes payment method 
P and funding source f is modelled as Prj = PrfP = PrP Prf|P. In this nested model, the IIA assumption is 
maintained for the sources of financing within the same payment method.  
 
Bidding Firm 
        
(1)  (2)  (3) 
        
Cash Payment  Mixed Payment  Equity Payment 
              
(1.1) (1.2) (1.3)  (2.1) (2.2)  (3.1) 







 Cash & Equity 
Financing 
Debt & Equity 
Financing 
 Equity Financing 
 
Figure 1. Specification of the payment-financing nested logit model 
 
                                                 
24 The advantage of the nested logit model over the multinomial logit is that the former is derived when the random noise in 
the value function has a generalized extreme value (GEV) distribution, which allows partial relaxation of the IIA property 
(McFadden, 1981). 
25 We do not consider a nested logit model with the reverse order of the payment-financing decision (i.e. the bidder chooses 
the means of payment conditional on the financing sources) because the setting and results of this model with respect to the 
determinants of the financing decision are similar to these of the multinomial logit model discussed in section 4.2.1.  
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The nested logit model is estimated using the full information maximum likelihood estimation method. 
As is the case for the multinomial logit model, the estimated coefficients in the nested logit model are not directly 
interpretable with respect to the probability that a particular alternative is chosen. The coefficients from the model 
represent the increases (decreases) in the log-odds ratio (relative to the benchmark case).  
  
4.2 Estimating the valuation effect of the bidder’s financing choice 
  
To capture the valuation effect of the bidder’s financing choice, we compute the takeover announcement 
effect on the bidder’s share price and compare it across deals financed by different types of capital. The market 
reaction to the takeover announcement is computed as a sum of the daily abnormal returns realized over the 
period starting 60 days prior to and ending 60 days subsequent the takeover announcement day.26 We also 
consider alternative event windows within the [-60, +60] interval to capture the pre-announcement and post-
announcement effects. Daily abnormal returns are computed as the difference between realized and market model 
benchmark returns. The market model uses the MSCI-Europe index and the parameters are estimated over 240 
days starting 300 days prior to the acquisition announcement.27 To test for significance of the estimated abnormal 
returns, we use two parametric test statistics (the portfolio test and the standardized test) as defined by Brown and 




5.1 The determinants of the bidder’s financing decision: univariate analysis 
 
Table 2 exhibits the mean values of the variables which we expect to explain the bidder’s choice of 
financing sources and payment method in corporate takeovers (see Section 2). The table indicates that the bidder 
characteristics vary substantially across acquisitions categorized by the different sources of financing and means 
of payment. In sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 we discuss the results of our univariate comparison of subsamples 
stratified by the sources of financing. In section 5.1.3 we examine the factors affecting the various payment 
methods. To test the null hypothesis that there are no significant differences in the mean values across the various 
types of takeovers, we employ an F-test (for level variables) and a Wald-test (for binary variables) and report the 
corresponding F- and χ2-statistics.  
 
                                                 
26 The event day is either the day of the announcement or the first trading day following the announcement in case the 
announcement is made on a non-trading day. 
27 Our estimates of the abnormal returns are robust with respect to different choices of the market index (a local, European-
wide, and worldwide index) and the estimation model of the benchmark returns (adjustment for mean-reversion (Blume, 
1979), and non-synchronous trading (Dimson, 1979)).   
28 The portfolio test statistic gives equal weights to the returns of individual securities and hence gives more weight to the 
CARs with a higher variance. The standardized test statistic assumes that the true CARs are constant across securities and 
gives more weight to the securities with a lower variance of the CARs. For reasons of conciseness, we only show the non-
parametric test statistics; the results of the parametric tests do not change the interpretation of the results and are available 
upon request.  
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5.1.1 Cost of Capital Considerations 
 
Pecking Order and Market Timing:  
In line with the pecking order predictions, panel A of table 2 reports that cash-rich bidders finance their 
M&As entirely with cash whereas firms with insufficient internally generated funds opt for external sources of 
financing. The ratio of the bidder’s cash flow to the transaction value (CFLOW/TRANSVAL) is only 0.21 when 
debt financing is used, 0.32 when the deal is financed with equity, and 2.70 when the deal is entirely financed 
with internal funds. Among the external sources of financing, debt is more prevalent in firms with more debt 
capacity. The financial leverage ratio (FIN LEVERAGE) is 0.40 for bidders that issue equity to fund M&As and 
it is only 0.34 for the firms that fund their deals with debt. Hence, the cost of capital conjecture (CC1(a)) is 
strongly supported by these univariate statistics. There is also some evidence that the equity financing decision is 
related to the prior performance of the bidder. The increase in the bidder’s share price over the period –60 to –20 
trading days relative to the initial announcement day (RUNUP) averages 2.21% when equity financing is 
involved, 1.96% when deal is financed with debt, and is insignificantly different from zero (at 0.34%) when 
internally generated cash is used. It should be noted that this run-up is already corrected for the strong upward 
equity market movement. This supports the cost of capital conjecture CC1(b). Furthermore, equity financing 
appears to be more frequently used in the periods of the stock market recovery and boom (1993-1996 and 1997-
1999, respectively) relative to the period with a stock market decline (2000-2001). These results suggest that 
firms rely on external sources of financing in circumstances when internally generated funds are insufficient. 
They opt for debt when financial leverage is relatively low, but prefer equity financing when the stock market is 
booming and their shares outperform the market. 




Panel A of table 2 also examines whether specific sources of transaction financing are chosen in different 
regulatory environments. The panel reveals that the choice of external sources of financing is related to better 
protection of the rights of shareholders and creditors, and to higher corporate transparency standards. The 
shareholder protection index adjusted for law enforcement (SH PRT x RULAW) averages 73.7 and 72.4 when the 
bidder uses debt and equity financing, respectively, and is only 58.3 when the bidder finances the deal entirely 
with internally generated funds. Similar patterns are observed with respect to the creditor protection index (CR 
PRT x RULAW): its values amount to 13.1 and 12.9 when debt financing and equity financing, respectively, are 
involved but only to 11.5 when financing occurs with internal cash. With regard to the corporate transparency 
standards (TRANSP x RULAW), debt financing and equity financing decisions are associated with values of 33.5 
and 30.2, respectively, versus 26.4 when the firm decides to finance the takeover with internal funds. Notably, 
among the external sources of financing, debt is associated with somewhat better shareholder and creditor 
protection and higher transparency standards. Our overall results support conjectures CC2 (a) and (b) the view 
that better legal investor protection facilitates the use of external sources of financing. When creditor rights are 
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well protected, companies do indeed tend to opt for debt to finance their M&As. However, we find no evidence 
that firms prefer equity to debt financing when shareholder protection is high.  
 
5.1.2 Agency Problems Between Corporate Claimants 
 
Agency Costs of Equity and Takeover Threats: 
The takeover financing decision is related to the bidding firm’s ownership structure. Financing with 
internal funds is more likely when the bidder’s largest shareholder owns 20% or more of the firm’s shares (panel 
B of table 2). In contrast, firms with a dispersed ownership structure tend to finance acquisitions more frequently 
with equity. Seventy-six per cent of the cash-financed takeovers are made by firms controlled by a blockholder 
(i.e. BLOCKHLDR>20 = 1), while 53% of equity-financed M&As are made by widely-held firms (without a 
blockholder owning at least 20% of firm’s shares). Although part of this relation may be determined by the 
bidder’s size (for which we control in the multivariate analysis of section 5.2), our univariate comparison suggests 
that the choice of equity financing is driven in some acquisitions by managerial self-interest (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976), as efficient monitoring of the management may be lower in widely-held firms. This finding 
supports conjecture AG1(a).  
Strikingly, among the bidders that finance their takeovers with debt, companies with a dispersed 
ownership structure dominate (61% of cases). This is due to the presence of UK and Irish acquirers in our sample 
as most of them have a dispersed ownership structure. The preference for debt financing by companies with a 
dispersed ownership structure may also result from the fact that these companies are more vulnerable to a 
takeover threat than their closely-held peers. Entrenched managers of widely-held firms may voluntarily signal 
their commitment to shareholder value creation by adopting debt financing in order to constrain their discretion 
over corporate funds. This way, they may reduce the likelihood that their company will be subject to a 
disciplinary takeover (Zwiebel, 1996; Franks, Mayer and Renneboog, 2001). This explanation is not, however, 
borne out by our data; we then reject conjecture AG1(b). The estimated likelihood of being acquired (TO 
THREAT) is 0.02 for bidders issuing debt, which is significantly lower than 0.05 for firms that finance M&As 
with internal funds, and 0.10 for bidders issuing equity.  
 
Debt Overhang: 
Bidding firms that opt for equity financing tend to have higher growth opportunities, which supports 
conjecture AG2. The bidder’s Q-ratio is 2.28 in equity-financed deals, 2.00 when debt financing is involved, and 
1.61 in cash-financed deals (panel B of table 2). The differences are statistically significant. When accounting-
based measures of growth opportunities are considered, the differences are even more pronounced: equity issuers 
have the highest average growth rate in capital expenditures (CAPX 3YGR), sales (SALES 3YGR), and total 
assets (TA 3YGR) over the 3 years prior to the year of the acquisition. The pattern is consistent with Myers 
(1977) debt overhang hypothesis: firms with high growth potential avoid debt financing to minimize the scope of 
underinvestment.  
 
Agency Cost of Debt and Financial Flexibility: 
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The results reported in panel B of table 2 also support (albeit weakly) the agency costs of debt conjecture 
(AG3(a)). Debt financing is more likely when the bidding firm is less risky. Debt financing is used in takeovers by 
more mature firms of 20.1 years old (see AGE). In contrast, equity financing prevails in M&As performed by 
relatively young (and hence more risky) firms with average age of 7.4 years. The bidder’s equity beta (BETA) of 
0.65 in debt-financed M&As is a little lower than that of equity-financed deals (0.66), although the difference is 
not statistically significant.    
 
5.1.3 Means of Payment Considerations 
 
Whereas panels A and B of table 2 focus on the determinants of the financing decision, panel C shows the 
mean values of variables we expect to determine the means of payment choice.  
 
Risk Sharing: 
Hansen (1987) predicts that acquirers of relatively large targets pay with equity in order to share the risk 
of the takeover with the target’s incumbent shareholders. In line with this prediction (MP1), panel C of table 2 
shows that all-equity payments are offered in M&As with an average value of $2,290 mln (see TRANSVAL), 
while the average value of takeovers with all-cash or mixed offers ranges between $114 mln and $1,106 mln. 
Among the M&As financed with equity, the transaction value of equity-paid deals ($2,290 mln) is more than 10 
times the value of cash-paid and mixed-paid M&As ($139 mln and $193 mln, respectively). The difference is also 
significant when we consider the relative size of the takeover: the ratio of the transaction value to the bidder’s 
market value (RELVAL) is 32.9% when the bidder pays with equity, and 18.8% when the bidder pays with cash 
(financed by an equity issue). An even lower relative size (of 11.3%) is observed in M&As involving cash 
payments financed with internal funds.  
 
The Threat of Control Change: 
Concerns about corporate control retention by bidding firms seem to have a significant impact on the 
choice of the payment method (panel C of table 2). If control of the target company is concentrated in the hands of 
a large blockholder, an equity payment may create a new blockholder in the bidding firm with an average equity 
stake of 16.2% (see CONTROL THREAT). In contrast, if cash-paid M&As (financed with equity) would have 
been entirely paid with equity, the target’s largest incumbent blockholder would receive an average stake of 
11.3% in the merged firm. This percentage is significantly lower for cash-paid M&As financed with internal 
funds (at 6.7%).  
The emergence of a new controlling shareholder with a block of 16.2% in all-equity acquisitions will be 
of little concern to the shareholders of the following two subsamples of firms making all-equity offers. Forty-eight 
per cent of bidders making an all-equity offer have no large controlling blockholders (i.e. ‘CONTROL<20’ =1). 
Another 14% are controlled by blockholders holding a supermajority-voting stake (i.e. ‘CONTROL>60’ =1) 
whose control positions are hardly challenged by the emergence of a new blockholder. The threat of a control 
change as a result of an equity payment is a more serious concern for shareholders holding an intermediate level 
of voting power. Indeed, panel C of table 2 shows that these firms are more likely to offer a cash payment: bidders 
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controlled by blockholders holding a combined stake within the 20-60% range (i.e. ‘20<CONTROL<60’ =1) 
make 50% of the cash-paid M&As that are financed with equity and 53% of the cash-paid takeovers that are 
financed with internal funds. In contrast, only 38% of the equity-paid M&As involve bidders with an intermediate 
concentration of control. This evidence is in line with the predictions of the control threat conjecture (MP2): the 
bidder’s management prefers cash over equity as a means of payment if an equity issue threatens the control of 
their largest shareholders.      
 
Characteristics of the Acquisition: 
Finally, we explore whether the characteristics of the takeover vary significantly with the payment 
method. Overall, 25% of the acquisitions are cross-border (i.e. CROSSBORDER BID =1) but this percentage 
increases to 36% for M&As involving internally financed cash payments. The lowest percentage of cross-border 
M&As is among equity-paid deals (19%). The public status of the target firm also appears to be relevant to the 
payment choice (see LISTED TARGET). Equity-paid acquisitions occur more frequently for firms listed on a 
stock exchange (59% of the cases), while cash-paid M&As happen more frequently when non-listed targets are 
involved (62% of the cases). The payment method does neither appear to be related to the form of the bid 
(TENDER OFFER), nor to how it is received by the target’s board of directors (HOSTILE BID), or to the degree 
of diversification of the merger (INTRA-IND BID).  
 
5.2 The determinants of the bidder’s financing decision: multivariate analysis 
 
5.2.1 Multinomial logit model  
 
Whereas the conclusions in the above section are based on univariate analyses, we now explore the 
combined effect of the characteristics of target and bidding firms and of the takeover bid itself on the takeover 
financing structure. As section 4.2 describes, two econometric techniques qualify to model the bidder’s financing 
decision: multinomial logit and nested logit regressions.  
The multinomial logit assumes that the bidder opts for a source of financing from four mutually exclusive 
(independent) alternatives: cash, debt, debt-and-equity, and equity.29 The model contains three binary logits that 
predict the probability that a particular source of financing is chosen in relation to equity financing (our 
benchmark). In order to examine the validity of the multinomial logit model we conduct several Hausman 
specification tests.30 As the tests fail to reject the assumption of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), 
we consider a multinomial logit model to be an appropriate specification for the bidder’s financing choice.31 The 
estimation results are shown in table 3.   
                                                 
29 As mentioned above, many of the deals financed with external capital are also partially financed with internally generated 
funds. For reasons of conciseness, we label these transactions by the type of external funding. E.g. a transaction financed 
with debt and equity can also be financed with some internally generated funds.  
30 In each test, we exclude different financing alternatives from the sample and test whether their exclusion leads to a 
proportionate increase in the probability of the other alternatives.  
31 However, the IIA assumption no longer holds when we consider the bidder’s simultaneous choice between six possible 
payment/financing alternatives: (i) cash payment/cash financing; (ii) cash payment/debt financing; (iii) cash 
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Column 1 of table 3 presents the logit model estimating the probability that an acquisition is financed 
with cash (relative to the probability of equity financing). Consistent with the pecking order hypothesis (CC1), we 
find that our proxies for the bidder’s internal financing capacity are statistically significant. Specifically, the 
likelihood of cash financing increases with the bidder’s internally generated cash flow (CFLOW/TRANSVAL). 
However, firms opt to raise capital via the stock market, rather than employ internal funds when they experience 
significant share price increases prior to the bid announcement (RUNUP). This implies that short term market 
timing influences the financing decision. Nor the stock market boom (1997-1999) nor the decline (2000-2001) 
seems to have much influence on the use of equity financing. The results presented in column 2 of table 3 
concerning the likelihood of debt (versus equity) financing provide further confirmation of the pecking order 
hypothesis: firms with high debt capacity (COLLATERAL) prefer borrowing to an equity issuance to fund 
M&As.   
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The regulatory environment hypothesis (CC2) is also supported by our data. Column 1 of table 3 shows 
that acquisitions financed by equity (relative to those financed by cash) are more likely in countries with stronger 
protection of shareholder rights (see SH PRT x RULAW). The evidence is in line with the prediction that strong 
shareholder protection reduces the cost of equity capital and hence increases the attractiveness of equity as a 
source of financing. Also, when the creditor rights protection is high (see CR PRT x RULAW), bidders prefer 
debt over equity financing (columns 2 and 3 of table 3). These results suggest that the legal protection of 
shareholders and creditors affects the costs of debt and equity capital, and thereby induces systematic corporate 
preferences for the most appropriate (less expensive) source of financing. 
The multinomial logit analysis does not support  the hypotheses on the agency costs of equity and on the 
takeover threat (AG1 (a) and (b)). The estimates for the likelihood of debt (versus equity) financing in column 2 
of table 3 reveal that neither the presence of a large blockholder (i.e. ‘BLOCKHLDR>20’ =1) nor the threat of 
being acquired (i.e. high TO THREAT) has a significant impact on the bidder’s decision to borrow in order to 
fund an acquisition.  
Both columns 1 and 2 of table 3 demonstrate that the probability of equity financing (versus cash and debt 
financing, respectively) increases with the Q-ratio of the bidding firm (see Q-RATIO). This confirms that 
companies with strong growth opportunities prefer financing M&As with equity in order to avoid conflicts of 
interests between shareholders and debtholders (hypothesis AG2). There is no evidence that risky firms (as 
proxied by BETA and AGE) systematically prefer equity financing (conjecture AG3). Therefore, we conclude that 
the decision to issue equity is unlikely to be influenced by the agency problems of debt.  
The bidder’s strategic preferences for specific types of means of payment may induce systematic 
preferences for specific types of financing. Consistent with the risk-sharing hypothesis (MP1), columns 1 and 2 of 
table 3 reveal that the likelihood of equity financing (relative to both cash and debt financing) increases with the 
relative size of the takeover (see RELVAL). That is, when a sizeable firm acquires a smaller firm, there is less 
                                                                                                                                                                         
payment/equity financing; (iv) mixed payment/cash financing; (v) mixed payment/debt financing; and (vi) equity payment. 
We will deal with all the combinations of payment and financing in section 5.2.3 and table 4 where we apply a nested logit 
structure.  
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need to share the risk of the transaction with the target’s shareholders by means of an equity offer. In contrast, 
funding with internal cash or borrowing is preferred to issuing equity when the bidding firm is vulnerable to the 
threat of control change. Column 1 of table 3 shows that bidders are more likely to use cash (versus equity) 
financing if their largest shareholders control an intermediate voting stake (i.e. ‘20<CONTROL<60’ =1), which 
could be eroded by an equity payment to the shareholders of a closely held target firm. Further, as reported in 
column 2 of table 3, the likelihood of debt (versus equity) financing increases with the percentage of shares that 
the target’s largest blockholder would get in the combined firm if the M&A would be entirely paid with equity 
(see CONTROL THREAT). A similar conclusion can be drawn from column 3. The evidence is consistent with 
the threat of control change hypothesis (MP2): the threat of a change in the firm’s control structure makes the 
bidding firm averse to all-equity payments.  
The relative size of the target firm and the potential control change are not the only takeover 
characteristics that affect the bidder’s choice of financing sources (or the payment method). The choice of 
financing (payment) method also depend on how the takeover bid is received by the target (is the acquisition 
opposed by the target’s board or is an offer made directly to the target’s shareholders - i.e. HOSTILE BID =1). 
Consistent with the view that a cash payment increases the probability of the hostile bid’s success (hypothesis 
MP3), columns 1 and 2 of table 3 show a positive relationship between the bid hostility and the choice of internal 
cash and debt financing (and hence a cash payment). However, other transaction-specific characteristics such as 
cross-border expansion, tender offer, listed target, and M&A within same industry do not appear to have a 
consistent impact on the financing (and payment) decision. 
To summarize, the results of our multinomial logit analysis suggest that equity issues takes place for 
reasons of cost of capital considerations: our hypotheses on the pecking order, market-timing, and financiers’ 
protection cannot be rejected. The thread of possible underinvestment due to debt overhang in the bidding firm 
also plays an important role in the choice of equity financing. Finally, we also find support for the hypothesis that 
the bidder’s decision on the financing sources depends on the preference for a specific payment method, which is 
in itself determined by the threat of a control change resulting from an equity-financed takeover.  
 
5.2.2 Nested logit model of the sequential payment-financing choice  
 
The nested logit model extends the multinomial logit framework by allowing the bidder to make its 
financing decision conditional on the preferred payment method. Columns 1 and 2 of table 4 report the estimates 
from the unconditional logit model of the probability that a takeover involves a cash or a mixed payment (relative 
to equity payment). Our results are similar to those of Faccio and Masulis (2005), who provide a comprehensive 
analysis of the determinants of the payment method in European corporate takeovers. The likelihood of an equity 
(versus cash) payment increases with the bidder’s share price run-up prior to the deal announcement and the 
relative size of the takeover. An equity offer is also more likely when the bid is made for a listed target firm. 
However, concerns regarding the potential change in the firm’s control structure drive the bidder’s decision to 
offer cash (rather than equity). These concerns mainly arise for the bidders whose control structure may change 
significantly if a new large shareholder emerges as a result of an equity payment; namely, for widely-held firms 
(i.e. ‘CONTROL<20’ =1) and firms controlled by a blockholder with an intermediate level of voting rights (i.e. 
 25 
‘20<CONTROL<60’ =1). A cash offer is also more likely in cross-border acquisitions and hostile takeovers. Our 
results suggest that the regulatory environment has no influence on the payment method in corporate takeovers.  
The only difference between our results and those of Faccio and Masulis (2005) is that we find no 
significant or consistent relationship between the bidder’s financial condition (e.g. cash flows and leverage) and 
the means of payment. However, we find that the bidder’s financial condition has a significant impact on the 
financing decision. Columns 3 and 4 of table 4 report the estimates from the logit model for the bidder’s financing 
decision conditional on an all-cash offer. Column 5 complements this analysis with the model for the choice 
between debt-and-equity and cash-and-equity financing conditional on a mixed offer.  
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Most of the results of the second (conditional) stage of the nested logit model reported in columns 3 and 4 
in table 4 are similar to those of the multinomial logit model shown in columns 1 and 2 of table 3. Specifically, 
the nested logit model confirms that the likelihood of financing with internal funds (versus equity) increases with 
the bidder’s cash flow, whereas debt financing is more likely to be used (relative to equity financing) when the 
bidder has higher collateral and when the stock market conditions deteriorate (i.e. in the period 2000-2001). Good 
stock performance prior to the bid (i.e. high RUNUP) and the large size of the bidding firm (high MVAL) lead to 
equity financing in cash-paid M&As. Also, the negative coefficient on the variable SH PRT x RULAW in column 
4 of Table 4 confirms that better legal protection of shareholder rights induces a lower cost of equity capital, so 
that companies are more likely to finance their activities with equity. However, column 5 of table 4 shows that 
better protection of creditor rights (i.e. high CR PRT x RULAW) makes the cost of debt relatively low compared 
to equity thereby encouraging firms to use debt instead of equity financing. Notably, none of the takeover 
characteristics and variables intended to proxy for the threat of a control change has significant explanatory power 
for the sources of financing choice conditional on an all-cash offer. The reason is that the control threat is only 
indirectly important for the financing of the transaction, namely through the choice of the payment method. 
The analysis of the choice between cash and equity financing and debt and equity financing of mixed 
offers reveals some interesting additional results (see column 5 of table 4). The cash component of the mixed 
offers is more likely to be funded with debt (rather than with internal cash) when the bidder’s internal funds are 
insufficient (low CFLOW/TRANSVAL), debt capacity is high (i.e. high COLLATERAL value and low FIN. 
LEVERAGE), growth opportunities are poor (low Q-RATIO), and the takeover is preceded by a significant 
decline in the share price of the bidding firm (low RUNUP). Interestingly, the cash component of the mixed 
payment in cross-border bids appears to be financed with internal funds, which suggests that bidders acquiring 
foreign companies may have more difficulties to raise funds via borrowing.32  
An important conclusion following from the analysis of the nested logit results is that the decisions on the 
means of payment and on the sources of financing are driven by different factors. The first stage of the nested 
logit model shows that bidding firms use the means of payment as a tool to reduce the risks associated with the 
takeover transaction such as the risk of the target firm’s misvaluation, the threat of a control change, and the risk 
of the bid’s failure (see columns 1 and 2 of table 4). None of these factors have a significant impact on the 
                                                 
32 It should be noted that this result refers to the financing (not payment) choice of the bidding firm. The results reported in 
column 5 of Table 3 are already corrected for the bidder’s preferences of specific payment methods.  
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bidder’s financing decision when it is conditioned on the means of payment. Instead, the second stage of the 
nested logit model reveals that the financing decision is influenced by the cost of capital at the firm level and at 
the country level (through corporate governance regulation) (see columns 3, 4, and 5 of table 4). As the 
financing/payment choices may have different implications for the value of the bidding firm, we investigate this 
issue in the next section.  
 
5.3 Valuation effect of the bidder’s financing and payment decisions 
 
The valuation effects of the payment/financing choices in corporate takeovers are exhibited in table 5 and 
figures 2 and 3. They show the evolution of the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) for bidding firms 
over a six-month period starting 60 days prior to and ending 60 days after the initial bid announcement day. When 
we stratify our sample by the means of payment (see figure 2), we find that over the six-month window centred 
around the takeover bid announcement day, the takeover returns to the bidder’s shareholders are significantly 
negative in takeovers involving equity payments (all-equity and mixed offers). The evidence is consistent with 
prior empirical findings (see e.g. Moeller et al, 2004; Andrade et al., 2001; Franks et al., 1991). However, the 
underperformance of those offers is largely due to the post-announcement share price correction. Prior to the bid, 








































Figure 2. Bidder CAARs by means of payment  Figure 3. Bidder CAARs by sources of financing 
 
The analysis of the subsamples by sources of transaction financing (see figure 3) reveals that that a 
negative price revision follows the announcement of any corporate takeover that involves equity financing. 
Remarkably, the only type of M&As that does not have a negative post-announcement price correction is a debt-
financed acquisition (see table 5). Over the [-60, +60] event window debt-financed acquisitions are expected to 
create a substantial value (of about 3%) to the bidding firms, which significantly exceeds the negative returns of 
M&As financed by equity and cash (-3.4% and -0.1%, respectively). A similar positive market reaction to debt-
financed M&As is documented in Bharadwaj and Shivdasani (2003). The evidence confirms that investors 
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consider a bank’s decision to provide funding as a positive signal about takeover profitability. Also, investors may 
interpret the debt financing decision as a confirmation that the bidder’s shares are not overvalued.   
Table 5 and figure 3 show that acquisitions financed with internally generated funds underperform debt-
financed deals on the announcement day (0.79% versus 1.32% respectively) and the former trigger significant 
negative share price revisions (of -1.35%) over the 3-month post-announcement period. This may be due to 
investor concerns that cash-financed deals may be driven by managerial empire building motives. Our results also 
support the view that an equity issue conveys a signal that the firm’s share price may be overvalued, which in turn 
triggers an adverse revaluation effect (Moeller et al, 2004; Andrade et al., 2001). We find that, in addition to the 
significant share price decline (-5.73%) over the 3-months period after the deal announcement, all-equity-financed 
M&As are associated with substantially lower announcement returns (0.49%) compared to the deals financed with 
cash and debt (0.79% and 1.32% respectively).  
It is important to highlight that the above results reveal that sources of transaction financing (in addition 
to the means of payment) are an important determinant of the market reaction to the takeover announcement. 
Investors are able to differentiate between the information about the payment method and the sources of takeover 
financing, and they do indeed take into account both these deal characteristics. To ensure that the observed effects 
are not driven by other characteristics of the bidding and target firms and the takeover deal itself, we also perform 
a multivariate analysis. In separate regressions, we investigate the factors affecting the cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs) realized prior to the bid over the period [-60, -2], at the bid announcement (over the 3 days centred 
around the event day), and subsequent to the bid over the period [+2, +60]. In order to capture the valuation effect 
of the bidder’s financing decision when the firm employs the same mode of payment, we also run regressions for 
the subsamples of all-cash and mixed offers. The determinants of the anticipated wealth creation for bidding firms 
are reported in Table 6.  
[INSERT TABLES 5 AND 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The regression results confirm that the sources of transaction financing are important determinants of the 
bidder’s share price reaction to the takeover announcement in addition to the means of payment. Over a 3-month 
period prior to the acquisition announcement, bidders using debt to finance the cash component of a mixed offer 
significantly underperform their peers using alternative financing and payment modes (see columns 1 and 7 of 
table 6). The post-announcement effect of debt-financed acquisitions is positive (albeit statistically insignificant; 
see columns 3 and 6 of table 6). In contrast, firms issuing equity to raise cash to pay for a takeover experience a 
significant share price decline over a 3-month period subsequent to the bid. The remainder of the results from 
table 6 are in line with the conclusions from the univariate analysis reported above.  
 
6. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 
In this section, we assess the robustness of our results by introducing additional variables and considering 
alternative proxies for variables employed in our nested logit analyses. First, we consider alternative 
specifications of variables characterizing the bidder’s control structure and its vulnerability with respect to the 
threat of a control change. Specifically, we reduce the control threshold from 20% to 10% and re-define the 
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bidder’s control structure with the following categories: it is a widely-held company if there is no blockholders 
holding at least 10% of voting rights; it is a company with an intermediate control concentration if there is a 
blockholder with a voting stake between 10% and 50%; and it is a company controlled by a blockholder holding a 
majority of voting rights if its stake is 50% or more. The decrease in the control threshold does not materially 
change the results of the nested logit with respect to the financing decisions. It affects nevertheless the results with 
respect to the choice of cash (versus equity) payment: whereas the coefficient on the indicator variable for the 
intermediate control structure (i.e. 10<CONTROL<50) improves its significance, the coefficient for the dispersed 
ownership structure (i.e. CONTROL<10) is no longer insignificant (though both coefficients retain their positive 
signs). This confirms that a threat of a control change is a serious concern for companies controlled by 
blockholders with an intermediate control structure. These firms prefer to pay with cash rather than equity to 
avoid the dilution of the voting power of the incumbent blockholder. However, the threat is no longer significant 
for widely held firms in which no blockholder owns at least 10%, suggesting that managers of these firms are less 
concerned about the emergence of a blockholder in the combined firm. We also consider control thresholds of 
15% and 5%. Whereas the adjustment to the 15% control threshold brings no changes to our original regressions 
estimated for the 20% threshold, an adjustment of the control stake to the 5% level eliminates the significance of 
the results with respect to the ‘threat of control change’ hypothesis. While using the 5% control threshold to 
indicate a blockholder-dominated firm makes sense for the UK, it does not for Continental European where a 
shareholder holding 5% is in most firms only a small minority shareholder (see Barca and Becht, 2001; Goergen 
and Renneboog, 2001).  
Second, instead of using the indicator variables for the periods of the stock market boom (1997-1999) and 
the decline (2000-2001), we include (in separate regressions) the total and monthly average MSCI-Europe index 
returns over the period of 6 months prior to the takeover bid as a proxy for the stock market performance. We find 
that both variables are positively and significantly related to the choice of equity payment and financing. The new 
evidence suggests that bidder’s managers interpret increasing market returns as a sign of stock market recovery 
and consider this as favorable circumstances for an equity issue. This effect is not captured by our dummy 
variables indicating the stock market boom and the decline as these variables are based on an ex-post assessment 
of the stock market conditions.  
Finally, our results of the nested logit models are robust with respect to the following alternative 
specifications: (i) we employ the industry-adjusted Q-ratio of the bidding firm; (ii) we include industry fixed 
effects; and (iii) we control for the bidder’s toehold in the target company (accumulated prior to the initial 




We investigate the bidder’s choice of the sources of financing in European corporate takeovers launched 
during the period 1993-2001, the fifth takeover wave. To our best knowledge, this is the first empirical study that 
simultaneously studies both the payment and financing decisions in corporate takeovers. The previous M&A 
literature has uniquely focused on the means of payment; these studies have typically ignored the sources of 
transaction financing in all-cash offers and have assumed that these offers are entirely financed with internally 
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generated funds. This paper shows that external sources of financing (debt and equity) are frequently employed 
even in cash-paid acquisitions and that the decisions on the financing and the means of payment are entirely 
different and driven by distinct factors. 
The results of our multinomial and nested logit analyses reveal that, while controlling for the payment 
method, bidders have systematic preferences for particular sources of financing which depend on their firm’s 
characteristics (such as the cash flows, debt capacity, corporate governance regulation, and growth opportunities) 
and on the characteristics of the takeover (relative size of the target, hostility, public or private status, etc.). Our 
findings are consistent with the view that the financing decision is influenced by the bidder’s concerns about the 
the cost of capital. In particular, in line with the pecking order hypothesis, cash-rich bidders opt for the least 
expensive source of financing – internally generated funds. Bidders with insufficient internal funds raise external 
capital to finance M&As: they employ borrowing when their debt capacity is high (leverage is low and the 
collateral value of their assets is high). They opt for an equity issue when investor sentiment is positive about the 
firm’s fundamental value (price run-up is high). However, the need of flexibility in managing corporate funds 
prevents firms with strong growth opportunities from financing the takeover with debt which may create a debt 
overhang problem and makes them use equity capital instead (even when they still have a high debt capacity). 
Bidders operating in a better corporate governance environment benefit from lower costs of external capital: debt 
financing is more likely when creditor rights are well protected by law and courts, and the use of equity financing 
increases when shareholder rights protection is high.  
The financing decision is unrelated to agency problems that may be induced by conflicts of interests 
between the management and shareholders: firms with dispersed ownership structure do not selectively prefer 
cash and equity financing over borrowing, though this is the least preferred source of financing by entrenched 
managers. Our data do not support the conjectured relationship between the financing choice and the agency 
problems induced by a conflict of interests between shareholders and creditors. Risky firms have no systematic 
preferences for equity financing even when debt financing may be less attractive.  
The takeover financing decision is influenced by the bidder’s strategic preferences for specific types of 
means of payment. As equity financing of M&As enables the bidder to make a direct equity offer to the target’s 
shareholders, the bidder may benefit from sharing the takeover’s risk with the target’s incumbent shareholders. 
The risk-sharing benefits of an equity offer increase with the relative size of the transaction. However, equity 
financing is less likely when the bidding firm is vulnerable to the threat of a control change. Large shareholders of 
bidding firms prefer financing with internal funds or debt (hence, a cash payment) if an all-equity bid could 
threaten their control position. This would occur if the bidder’s large shareholders hold an intermediate level of 
control and the target has a concentrated control structure. In addition, equity financing is less frequent in hostile 
bids and M&As of unlisted targets; these deals typically involve cash payments financed with internal funds or 
debt. Our nested logit analysis reveals some factors only influence the financing choice indirectly, namely when 
we condition financing on the payment mode.  
We also document that the financing decision has a significant impact on the value of the bidding firm. 
Investors take into account the information signalled by the choices of both the payment method and the sources 
of takeover financing when estimating the possible synergistic value of the takeover at the announcement. A 
significantly negative price revision following the announcement of a takeover is common for equity-paid 
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takeovers and is also observed in any other takeover deals that involve equity financing (including cash-paid and 
mixed-paid M&As). The evidence confirms that investors consider equity issues as a signal that the firm’s shares 
are overvalued. We also find that acquisitions financed with internally generated funds underperform debt-
financed deals, which suggests that investors are wary that cash-financed deals may be driven by managerial 
empire building motives. In contrast, debt financing conveys a positive signal to the market that the firm’s shares 
are not overvalued and the takeover is expected to be profitable.  
Answering the question in the title of this paper ‘What determines the financing decision in corporate 
takeovers: cost of capital, agency costs or the means of payment?’, we have found that the financing is in the first 
instance determined by the cost of capital both at the firm and the country/regulatory level. Whereas agency costs 
do not seem to influence the financing decision, the means of payment indirectly does. Bidding firms use the 
means of payment as a tool to reduce the risks associated with the takeover deal, such as the risk of the target 
firm’s misvaluation, the threat of a control change, and the risk of the bid’s failure. In this paper, we have 
highlighted that the two decisions (the means of payment and the sources of financing) in a corporate takeover bid 
are driven by distinct factors. Judging from the M&A announcement returns, we conclude that, in addition to the 
means of payment, the way a takeover deal is financed transmits important information to the market about 
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Appendix I. Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
(B) MVAL (m US$) Market capitalization of the bidding firm 60 days prior to the initial bid announcement. Source: 
DataStream 
(T) BLOCKHDR>20 Indicator equals one if target firm is controlled by a blockholder owning more than 20% voting stake 
prior to the takeover. Source: see Appendix II. 
1993-1996 Indicator equals one if the bid was initiated in the period between January 1, 1993 and December 31, 
1996; equals zero otherwise.  Source: SDC 
1997-1999 Indicator equals one if the bid was initiated in the period between January 1, 1997 and December 31, 
1999; equals zero otherwise.  Source: SDC 
20<CONTROL<60 Indicator equals one if bidding firm is controlled by a blockholder owing more than 20 but less than 
60% of the voting rights (20%<=CONTROL<60%). Source: see Appendix II. 
2000-2001 Indicator equals one if the bid was initiated in the period between January 1, 2000 and December 31, 
2001; equals zero otherwise.  Source: SDC 
AGE Number of years since the firm was incorporated. Source: Amadeus/Fame/Reach and DataStream 
BETA Equity beta of the bidding firm, estimated using the market model over the period of 300 to 60 days 
before the M&A announcement. The market index is the MSCI Europe. Source: own computations  
BLOCKHDR>20 Indicator equals one if bidding firm is controlled by a blockholder owning a voting stake of 20% or 
more. Source: see Appendix II. 
CAPX 3YGR (%) Bidder’s average annually compounded growth rate in capital expenditures (scaled by the total assets) 
over the three-year period preceding the year of the M&A announcement. Source: 
Amadeus/Fame/Reach and DataStream 
CASH FIN Indicator equals one if internal sources are employed to finance the cash component of the payment in 
corporate takeover, and equals zero otherwise. Source: LexisNexis, Factiva, and Financial Times 
CASH PMT Indicator equals one if the acquisition is fully paid with cash, and equals zero otherwise. Source: SDC, 
LexisNexis, Factiva, and Financial Times 
CASH PMT- DEBT FIN Indicator equals one if borrowing is used to finance the all-cash payment, and equals zero otherwise. 
Source: SDC, LexisNexis, Factiva, and Financial Times 
CASH PMT- EQTY FIN Indicator equals one if an equity issue is used to finance the all-cash payment, and equals zero 
otherwise. Source: SDC, LexisNexis, Factiva, and Financial Times 
CROSSBORDER BID Indicator equals one if the bidder and target are from different countries, and equals zero otherwise. 
Source: SDC, LexisNexis, Factiva, and Financial Times 
CFLOW/TA Ratio of total cash flow (including cash flow from operating, financial, and investment activities) to 
total assets, at the year-end prior to the deal announcement. Source: Amadeus/Fame/Reach and 
DataStream 
CFLOW/TRANSVAL Ratio of the bidder’s total cash flow (including cash flow from operating, financial, and investment 
activities) over the price paid for the acquisition. Cash flow is at the year-end prior to the deal 
announcement. Source: SDC and Amadeus/Fame/Reach and DataStream 
CHLDG/TRANSVAL Ratio of the bidder’s cash holdings (cash and cash equivalents in place) over the price paid for the 
acquisition. Cash and cash equivalents are at the year end prior to the deal announcement Source: SDC 
and Amadeus/Fame/Reach and DataStream 
COLLATERAL Variable that takes the value of the tangible assets of the combined firm: sum of the bidder’s and 
target’s tangible assets scaled by the sum of their total assets. All measures are at the year prior to the 
deal announcement. Source: computed based on Amadeus/Fame/Reach and DataStream 
CONTROL THREAT (%) Target’s largest controlling share block multiplied by RELVAL. If the target is unlisted, the 
controlling share block prior to the takeover deal is assumed to be 100%. Source: SDC, 
Amadeus/Fame/Reach and sources reported in Appendix II. 
CONTROL (%) Ultimate voting stake owned by the bidder’s largest shareholder. Source: see Appendix II. 
CONTROL<20 
 
Indicator equals one if the bidding firm is widely-held: there is no shareholder owning 20% or more of 
the voting rights. Source: see Appendix II. 
CONTROL>60 Indicator equals one if bidding firm is controlled by a large blockholder owning 60% or more of the 
voting rights. Source: see Appendix II. 
CORRUPT The corruption index, which indicates the extent to which one can exercise public power for private 
gain. It quantifies indicators ranging from the frequency of “additional payments to get things done” to 
the effects of corruption on the business environment. The index ranges between 0 and 5, with higher 
values corresponding to better quality of law enforcement. Source: The World Bank 
(http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/) 
CR PRT x RULAW Variable that takes the value of the Creditor rights protection index (CREDITOR PRT) multiplied by 
the Rule of Law index (RULE OF LAW). Source: own computations 
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Variable Definition 
CREDITOR PRT The creditor rights protection index, which hinges on the regulatory provisions that allow creditors to 
force repayment more easily, to take possession of the collateral, or even to gain control over the firm 
in case of financial distress. The index ranges between 0 and 5, with higher values corresponding to 
better regulatory protection of creditor rights. Source: Martynova and Renneboog (2008b) 
DEBT FIN Indicator equals one if a debt issue is used to raise cash, and equals zero otherwise. Source: 
LexisNexis, Factiva, and Financial Times 
DEBT/EQUITY FIN Indicator equals one if both debt and equity issues are used to raise cash, and equals zero otherwise. 
Source: LexisNexis, Factiva, and Financial Times 
EQUITY FIN Indicator equals one if an equity issue is used to raise cash, and equals zero otherwise. Source: 
LexisNexis, Factiva, and Financial Times 
EQUITY PMT Indicator equals one if the acquisition is fully paid with equity, and equals zero otherwise. Source: 
SDC, LexisNexis, Factiva, and Financial Times 
FIN LEVERAGE Bidding firm’s long-term debt prior to the M&A announcement plus the deal value, all divided by the 
sum of the bidding firm’s total assets prior to the M&A announcement and the deal value. Source: 
computed based on DataStream, Amadeus/Fame/Reach, SDC, LexisNexis, Factiva, and Financial 
Times 
HOSTILE BID Indicator equals one if initial takeover offer meets a negative reaction by the targets’ board or 
management or if a competing bid is made. Source: SDC, LexisNexis, Factiva, and Financial Times 
INTRA-IND BID Indicator equals one if the bidder and target operate in the same industry (primary 2-digit SIC code 
coincides), and equals zero otherwise. Source: SDC and Amadeus/Fame/Reach 
LEVERAGE Ratio of the bidder’s total debt (short-term and long-term) to total assets at the year-end prior to the 
deal announcement. Source: Amadeus/Fame/Reach and DataStream 
LISTED TARGET Indicator equals one if the target firm is listed on any stock exchange at the moment of bid 
announcement, and is zero otherwise. Source: SDC, LexisNexis, Factiva, and Financial Times 
MIX PMT - DEBT FIN Indicator equals one if borrowing is used to finance the cash component of the mixed payment, and 
equals zero otherwise. Source: SDC, LexisNexis, Factiva, and Financial Times 
MIXED PMT Indicator equals one if the acquisition is paid with a combination of cash and equity, and equals zero 
otherwise. Source: SDC, LexisNexis, Factiva, and Financial Times 
Q-RATIO Bidder’s ratio of the market value of equity (ordinary and preferred) plus book value of long-term debt 
over the sum of book value of equity and book value of long-term debt. The market value of equity is 
taken 60 days prior to deal announcement; book values of equity and debt are at the year-end prior to 
deal announcement.  Source: Amadeus/Fame/Reach and DataStream 
RELVAL (%) The ratio of the TRANSVAL over the sum of the TRANSVAL plus the bidder’s market 
capitalization. Source: SDC, LexisNexis, Factiva, Financial Times, Amadeus/Fame/Reach and 
DataStream 
RULE OF LAW The Rule of Law index, which measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by 
the rules of society, and these include the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary and the 
enforceability of contracts. It quantifies indicators which measure the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society. The index ranges between 0 and 5, with higher values 
corresponding to the better quality of law enforcement. Source: The World Bank 
(http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/). 
RUNUP (%) Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the bidder over the window [-60, -20] preceding the takeover 
announcement day. Daily abnormal returns are computed as the difference between realized and 
market model benchmark returns. The market model uses the MSCI-Europe index and the parameters 
are estimated over 240 days starting 300 days prior to the acquisition announcement. Source: own 
computations  
SALES 3YGR (%) Bidder’s average annually compounded growth rate in sales revenues (scaled by total assets) over the 
three-year period preceding the year of takeover announcement. Source: DataStream and 
Amadeus/Fame/Reach  
SH PRT x RULAW Variable that takes the value of the Shareholder rights protection index (SHAREHDR PRT) multiplied 
by the Rule of Law index (RULE OF LAW). Source: own computations 
SHAREHDR PRT The shareholder rights protection index captures the shareholders’ ability to mitigate managerial 
opportunistic behaviour. The index ranges between 0 and 25, with higher values corresponding to 
better governance outcomes. Source: Martynova and Renneboog (2008b) 
TA 3YGR (%) Bidder’s average annually compounded growth rate in total assets over the three-year period 
preceding the year of the deal announcement. Source: Amadeus/Fame/Reach and DataStream 
TENDER OFFER Indicator variable equals one if the bidder makes a public offer to purchase shares of the target firm 
and the takeover is not classified as hostile (see HOSTILE BID), and is zero otherwise. Source: SDC, 
LexisNexis, Factiva, and Financial Times 
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Variable Definition 
TO THREAT Measure of the bidder’s takeover vulnerability: the likelihood of being acquired, estimated with a 
probit model for the sample of European firms for the period 1993-2001. The sample is constructed as 
unbalanced panel with 9-years time series. The dependent variable equals one if a firm was acquired 
during the year and is zero otherwise. The estimates of the probit model are available from the authors 
upon request. Source: own computations  
TOEHOLD Percentage of the target firm’s shares that the bidder held prior to the bid announcement. Source: SDC, 
LexisNexis, Factiva, and Financial Times 
TRANSP x RULAW Variable that takes the value of the Transparency index (TRANSPARENCY) multiplied by the Rule 
of Law index (RULE OF LAW). Source: own computations 
TRANSPARENCY The transparency index reflects the degree to which the market is informed about the corporate 
policies and contracts directly related to the management, and the frequency with which this 
information is released. The index ranges between 0 and 10, with higher values corresponding to 
better transparency. Source: Martynova and Renneboog (2008b) 




Appendix II. Sources of ownership data 
 
We collect ownership data for bidding and target firms from annual reports, from institutions such as the shareholder register of national 
stock exchanges, as well as from the ownership and control researchers listed below.  
 
Country Data source 
Austria Prof. Dr. Klaus Gugler (University of Vienna); Faccio and Lang (2002). 
Belgium Prof. Dr. Christoph van der Elst (Tilburg University); own dataset. 
Cyprus Stockwatch Cyprus (http://www.stockwatch.com.cy) . 
Czech Rep. SCP- The Prague Securities Centre (http://www.scp.cz). 
Denmark Prof. Dr. Steen Thomsen and Mr. Michael Emil Olinger (Copenhagen Business School). 
Estonia Tallinn Stock Exchange (http://www.ee.omxgroup.com). 
Finland Prof. Dr. Benjamin Maury (HANKEN Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration). 
France Prof. Dr. Alain Alcouffe (Toulouse University); Faccio and Lang (2002). 
Germany Prof. Dr. Ekkehart Boehmer (Texas A&M University); Faccio and Lang (2002). Own dataset.  
Ireland     Thomson Financial Research: annual reports of individual firms; Faccio and Lang (2002). 
Italy Prof. Dr. Marcello Bianchi (CONSOB). 
Latvia Riga Stock Exchange (http://www.rfb.lv); Dr. Anete.Pajuste (Riga Business School). 
Lithuania Vilnius Stock Exchange (http://www.nse.lt). 
Netherlands Financieel Dagblad, and annual reports. Own dataset. 
Norway Prof. Dr. Bernt Arne Odegaard (Norwegian School of Management BI). 
Poland Dr. Grzegorz Trojanowski (University of Exeter). 
Portugal Prof. Dr. Carlos Ferreira Alves (Porto University); Mr. Pedro Verga Matos (Universidade Técnica de 
Lisboa); CMVM - Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliários (www.cmvm.pt). 
Romania Bucharest Stock Exchange (http://www.bvb.ro). 
Slovenia Dr. Aleksandra Gregoric (Ljubljana University). 
Spain Prof. Dr. Rafel Crespí (Universitat de les Illes Balears); CNMV- Comisión Nacional del Mercado de 
Valores (http://www.cnmv.es). 
Sweden Prof. Dr. Martin Holmen (Uppsala University). 
Switzerland Dr. Markus Schmid (University of Basel); Mr. Diego Dimitri Liechti (Universität Bern): data source Swiss 
Stock Guide (Schweizer Aktienfuehrer). 
UK Dr. Grzegorz Trojanowski (University of Exeter); Faccio and Lang (2002); Own dataset. Thomson 















































                    
Total number of M&As 1361  13 18 27 35 130 72 20 38 2 17 39 1 34 62 26 801 26 
% of the sample  100 1.0 1.3 2.0 2.6 9.6 5.3 1.5 2.8 0.1 1.2 2.9 0.1 2.5 4.6 1.9 58.9 1.9 
    
   % OF M&A DEALS IN THE COUNTRY: 
Cash Financing: 590 43.4 69.2 66.7 66.7 62.9 62.3 61.1 45.0 78.9 100 52.9 59.0 100 70.6 53.2 53.8 29.7 80.8 
 Cash payment 590 43.4 69.2 66.7 66.7 62.9 62.3 61.1 45.0 78.9 100 52.9 59.0 100 70.6 53.2 53.8 29.7 80.8 
                    
Debt Financing: 173 12.7 0.0 0.0 11.1 0.0 5.4 8.3 10.0 7.9 0.0 29.4 0.0 0.0 5.9 1.6 23.1 17.2 0.0 
 Cash payment 173 12.7 0.0 0.0 11.1 0.0 5.4 8.3 10.0 7.9 0.0 29.4 0.0 0.0 5.9 1.6 23.1 17.2 0.0 
                    
Debt & Equity Financing: 139 10.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.9 3.1 2.8 20.0 2.6 0.0 5.9 2.6 0.0 5.9 3.2 0.0 15.1 0.0 
 Cash payment 42 3.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 1.4 15.0 2.6 0.0 5.9 0.0 0.0 2.9 1.6 0.0 4.0 0.0 
 Cash-and-Equity payment 97 7.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.9 1.5 1.4 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.6 0.0 2.9 1.6 0.0 11.1 0.0 
                    
Equity Financing: 459 33.7 30.8 33.3 22.2 34.3 29.2 27.8 25.0 10.5 0.0 11.8 38.5 0.0 17.6 41.9 23.1 38.0 19.2 
 Cash payment 49 3.6 0.0 0.0 3.7 8.6 3.1 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.1 0.0 0.0 4.8 0.0 4.2 3.8 
 Cash-and-Equity payment 162 11.9 7.7 5.6 3.7 2.9 3.8 4.2 10.0 2.6 0.0 5.9 5.1 0.0 2.9 8.1 7.7 17.0 0.0 
 Equity payment 248 18.2 23.1 27.8 14.8 22.9 22.3 22.2 15.0 7.9 0.0 5.9 28.2 0.0 14.7 29.0 15.4 16.7 15.4 
                    
All Sources of Financing: 1361 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 Cash payment 854 62.8 69.2 66.7 81.5 71.4 72.3 72.2 70.0 89.5 100 88.2 64.1 100 79.4 61.3 76.9 55.2 84.6 
 Cash-and-Equity payment 259 19 7.7 5.6 3.7 5.7 5.4 5.6 15.0 2.6 0.0 5.9 7.7 0.0 5.9 9.7 7.7 28.1 0.0 
 Equity payment 248 18.2 23.1 27.8 14.8 22.9 22.3 22.2 15.0 7.9 0.0 5.9 28.2 0.0 14.7 29.0 15.4 16.7 15.4 
                    
 
ALL=All countries, AUS=Austria, BEL=Belgium, DEN=Denmark, FIN=Finland, FRA=France, GER=Germany, IRE=Republic of Ireland, ITA=Italy, LUX=Luxembourg, 
NL=The Netherlands, NOR=Norway, POR=Portugal, ESP=Spain, SWE=Sweden, SWZ=Switzerland, UK=The United Kingdom, OTH = Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia 
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Table 2. Average values of the determinants of the choice of the sources of financing 
 
This table reports the mean values of the variables expected to affect the bidder’s choice of financing sources. Columns (7) and (12) report an F-test (for level variables) and a Wald test (for 
binary variables) for the difference in means across acquisitions involving different means of payment (but the same sources of transaction financing). Columns (13), (14), and (15) report an 
F-test (for level variables) and a Wald test (for binary variables) for the difference in means across acquisitions involving different sources of financing (but the same means of payment). 
Superscripts a/b/c correspond to the statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level, respectively. To assess the significance of the estimated run-up premium, RUNUP (%), we perform a 



















































 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
PANEL A: COST OF CAPITAL CONSIDERATIONS 
CC1. Pecking Order and Market Timing: 
CFLOW/TRANSVAL 0.96 2.71 0.21 0.26 0.21 0.27 1.2  (.306) 0.32 0.52 0.81 0.14 4.9a (.008) 6.7a (.000) 12.4a (.000) 8.5a (.000) 
CHLDG/TRANSVAL 0.80 2.81 0.59 0.17 0.09 0.20 1.9  (.163) 0.36 0.67 0.61 0.16 5.2a (.006) 7.3a (.000) 11.7a (.000) 6.5a (.000) 
COLLATERAL 0.33 0.32 0.34 0.34 0.43 0.31 0.6  (.572) 0.34 0.35 0.32 0.35 0.8  (.452) 0.8  (.492) 3.5b (.015) 1.3  (.282) 
FIN LEVERAGE 0.34 0.26 0.32 0.43 0.47 0.42 0.9  (.422) 0.40 0.34 0.35 0.46 3.7 b (.028) 23.2a (.000) 8.6a (.000) 4.5a (.005) 
RUNUP (%) 0.92 0.34 1.96y 2.01y 5.41z -2.69z 10.6 a (.000) 2.21z 2.72z 1.82z 2.33z 0.3  (.733) 3.4 b (.017) 7.2a (.000) 9.8a (.000) 
1993-1996 0.34 0.34 0.25 0.34 0.40 0.31 χ2=    1.9  (.382) 0.39 0.43 0.41 0.37 χ2=    2.3  (.319) χ2=  10.9b (.012) χ2=  12.2a (.007) χ2=   5.9  (.115) 
1997-1999 0.41 0.43 0.45 0.40 0.40 0.40 χ2=    3.6  (.167) 0.39 0.45 0.38 0.39 χ2=    3.3  (.192) χ2=    1.6  (.652) χ2=    1.7  (.630) χ2=   5.8  (.118) 
2000-2001 0.24 0.23 0.30 0.26 0.20 0.29 χ2=    2.2  (.331) 0.22 0.12 0.21 0.24 χ2=    4.7c (.095) χ2=    6.1  (.104) χ2=    8.8b (.032) χ2=   5.5  (.141) 
CC2. Regulatory environment: 
SH PRT x RULAW 65.1 58.3 73.7 73.7 72.6 77.0 8.1a (.000) 72.4 67.9 74.2 72.8 32.9a (.000) 65.1a (.000) 41.3a (.000) 1.0  (.378) 
CR PRT x RULAW 12.2 11.5 13.1 13.0 12.6 13.1 2.2  (.120) 12.9 12.4 13.0 13.1 6.7a (.001) 27.7a (.000) 16.7a (.000) 0.2  (.909) 
TRANSP x RULAW 29.4 26.4 33.5 33.5 32.5 35.4 5.1a (.007) 30.2 30.0 33.2 28.4 21.7a (.000) 54.0a (.000) 34.8a (.000) 2.3c (.079) 
                
PANEL B: AGENCY PROBLEMS BETWEEN CLAIMANTS 
AG1. Agency Costs of Equity and Takeover Threat: 
CONTROL (%) 29.9 35.3 23.6 18.6 17.4 19.5 0.7  (.494) 27.1 30.0 23.6 28.4 1.9  (.158) 12.9a (.000) 5.2a (.002) 0.8  (.489) 
BLOCKHLDR>20 0.55 0.67 0.39 0.32 0.23 0.34 χ2=    1.5  (.463) 0.47 0.67 0.36 0.52 χ2=    6.9b (.032) χ2=  40.7a (.000) χ2=  24.5a (.000) χ2=   1.3  (.737) 
TO THREAT 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.04 1.0  (.369) 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.11 0.1  (.872) 4.2a (.006) 1.3  (.292) 0.9  (.406) 
AG2. Debt Overhang: 
Q-RATIO 1.81 1.61 2.00 1.63 1.64 1.57 0.2  (.652) 2.28 2.65 2.54 2.01 0.9  (.407) 4.2a (.005) 2.9b (.034) 5.5b (.020) 
CAPX 3YGR (%) 8.5 8.5 4.4 9.4 3.8 14.4 7.2a (.008) 26.7 33.1 19.5 34.7 3.8b (.023) 6.7a (.000) 8.5a (.000) 0.4  (.766) 
SALES 3YGR (%) 24.2 21.8 24.3 23.5 20.2 25.6 4.1b (.045) 31.6 25.2 39.3 27.3 2.6c (.075) 5.8a (.000) 0.6  (.650) 4.6b (.033) 




















































 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
                
AG3. Agency Cost of Debt and Financial Flexibility: 
BETA 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.54 0.39 0.60 5.8b (.017) 0.66 0.69 0.58 0.73 5.1a (.006) 1.22 (.296) 4.2a (.006) 0.0  (.991) 
AGE 16.1 23.5 20.1 10.2 8.4 10.7 0.9  (.344) 7.4 5.3 18.0 3.6 9.4a (.000) 7.6a (.000) 11.5a (.000) 2.3  (.130) 
                
PANEL C: MEANS OF PAYMENT CONSIDERATIONS 
MP1. Risk Sharing: 
TRANSVAL (m US$) 603 114 433 732 1,106 568 8.4a (.000) 1,236 139 193 2,290 11.1a (.000) 13.3a (.000) 7.2a (.000) 5.2b (.023) 
(B) MVAL (m US$) 2,249 1,952 4,400 871 1,172 761 12.5a (.000) 2,788 1,385 513 3,913 9.7a (.000) 17.8a (.000) 4.7a (.003) 1.6  (.187) 
RELVAL (%) 19.5 11.3 17.7 31.3 31.3 31.3 1.5  (.225) 23.3 18.8 19.9 32.9 22.1a (.000) 23.1a (.000) 2.8b (.039) 11.4a (.000) 
MP2. The Threat of Control Change: 
CONTROL THREAT  (%) 10.6 6.7 8.9 20.3 19.8 20.6 1.1  (.297) 14.7 11.3 10.9 16.2 2.5c (.085) 19.0a (.000) 2.2c (.087) 8.5a (.000) 
CONTROL<20 0.45 0.33 0.61 0.68 0.77 0.66 χ2=    1.5  (.463) 0.53 0.33 0.65 0.48 χ2=    6.9b (.032) χ2=  40.7a (.000) χ2=  24.5a (.000) χ2=   1.3  (.737) 
20<CONTROL<60 0.43 0.53 0.31 0.31 0.15 0.34 χ2=    2.3  (.314) 0.37 0.50 0.31 0.38 χ2=    1.5  (.468) χ2=  19.9a (.000) χ2=  14.2a (.003) χ2=   1.0  (.799) 
CONTROL>60 0.12 0.14 0.08 0.01 0.08 0.00 χ2=    4.9c (.083) 0.10 0.17 0.04 0.14 χ2=    6.8b (.034) χ2=  10.0a (.018) χ2=    2.1  (.546) χ2=   1.8  (.613) 
(T) BLOCKHDR>20 0.90 0.94 0.70 0.84 0.78 0.89 χ2=    3.6  (.166) 0.90 0.97 0.95 0.85 χ2=    2.4  (.304) χ2=  50.9a (.000) χ2=  49.2a (.000) χ2=   5.2  (.157) 
MP3. Characteristics of Acquisition: 
CROSSBORDER BID 0.25 0.36 0.23 0.10 0.26 0.03 χ2=  13.6a (.001) 0.19 0.26 0.17 0.19 χ2=    2.3  (.315) χ2=  56.0a (.000) χ2=    8.2b (.042) χ2= 12.3a (.006) 
TENDER OFFER 0.32 0.23 0.58 0.51 0.60 0.32 χ2=   17.6  (.000) 0.34 0.34 0.24 0.39 χ2=  19.3a (.000) χ2=  81.3a (.000) χ2=  55.8a (.000) χ2= 14.9a (.002) 
HOSTILE BID 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.07 χ2=    7.1a (.008) 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 χ2=    0.1  (.932) χ2=  14.0a (.003) χ2=  12.6a (.006) χ2=   4.3  (.235) 
LISTED TARGET 0.43 0.38 0.61 0.48 0.57 0.29 χ2=  14.5a (.000) 0.46 0.38 0.28 0.59 χ2=  67.9a (.000) χ2=  28.8a (.000) χ2=  34.3a (.000) χ2=  12.2  (.007) 
INTRA-IND BID 0.65 0.65 0.69 0.64 0.73 0.54 χ2=    5.2b (.023) 0.65 0.65 0.60 0.67 χ2=    3.3  (.188) χ2=     3.0  (.385) χ2=    1.7  (.645) χ2=   1.7  (.632) 
                
Number of obs. 1361 590 173 139 42 97 139 459 49 162 248 459 1361 854 259 
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 Table 3. Multinomial logit model predicting the bidder’s financing choice 
 
The table reports a multinomial logit model that describes the bidder’s choice of the financing method in corporate takeovers. 
Four possible choices are considered: (i) cash financing (cash-paid/cash-financed deals); (ii) debt financing (cash-paid/debt-
financed deals); (iii) equity-and-debt financing (cash-paid/equity&debt-financed and mixed-paid/debt&equity financed deals); 
and (iv) equity financing (equity-paid/equity-financed, cash-paid/equity-financed, and mixed-paid/cash-financed deals). The 
multinomial logit model includes three binary logit models. Each binary logit predicts a probability of choosing one of the first 
three alternatives relative to the probability of choosing the benchmark, which is all-equity financing. A Wald test is used to test 
for significance of the estimated coefficients and the overall regression; the p-value of the Wald Chi-square statistic is reported 
(Pr > χ2). The total sample consists of 1361 acquisitions and includes 459 acquisitions financed by equity. The Chi-square 
statistic on the significance of the overall model is significant at the 0.0001% level. Variable definitions are given in Appendix I.  
a/b/c stand for statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level, respectively. 
 
Explanatory variables CASH Financing 
(vs EQUITY Financing) 
DEBT Financing 
(vs EQUITY Financing) 
DEBT & EQUITY Financing 
(vs EQUITY Financing) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Coeff Pr > χ2 Coeff Pr > χ2 Coeff Pr > χ2 
       
INTERCEPT  -6.15
a .003 -7.69a .004 -9.22a .002 
Cost of Capital (CC1). Pecking Order and Market Timing: 
CFLOW/TRANSVAL 0.03
c .061 0.05 .744 -0.07c .086 
COLLATERAL 1.64
b .046 1.72b .042 1.68 .177 
FIN LEVERAGE 0.33 .802 0.24 .406 -0.19 .767 
RUNUP  -0.26
b .035 -0.12 .562 -0.48c .092 
1997-1999 0.22 .312 -0.11 .327 -0.30 .550 
2000-2001 0.04 .794 0.34 .104 0.12 .614 
Cost of Capital (CC2). Regulatory Environment: 
SH PRT x RULAW -0.08
a .000 -0.04 .262 -0.03 .574 
CR PRT x RULAW 0.24 .308 0.14
b .020 0.17b .038 
TRANSP x RULAW -0.05 .560 -0.06 .303 -0.01 .898 
Agency Costs (AG1). Agency Cost of Equity and Takeover Threat: 
BLOCKHLDR>20 0.56 .436 0.53 .602 0.49 .829 
TO THREAT -1.18 .210 -1.09 .338 -1.67 .294 
Agency Costs (AG2). Debt Overhang and AG3. Agency Cost of Debt and Financial Flexibility: 
Q-RATIO -0.06
b .043 -0.03 .253 -0.14b .047 
BETA 0.32 .611 -0.24 .662 -0.03 .870 
AGE 0.03 .705 0.04 .655 0.01 .937 
Means of Payment (MP1). Risk Sharing: 
MVAL (log) -0.04 .480 0.25
a .006 0.32a .004 
RELVAL  -3.63
a .000 -2.40c .065 1.34b .018 
Means of Payment (MP2). The Threat of Control Change: 
CONTROL THREAT  0.17 .149 0.15
c .074 0.11c .058 
20<CONTROL<60 1.83
b .032 0.56 .385 0.94 .506 
Means of Payment (MP3). Characteristics of Acquisition: 
CROSSBORDER BID 0.04 .959 0.24 .533 -1.74
a .006 





 .039 0.87 .156 
LISTED TARGET -0.38 .153 -0.20 .909 -1.47
c .063 
INTRA-IND BID -0.04 .815 -0.15 .758 -0.08 .721 
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Table 4. Nested logit model: the payment-financing choice 
 
This table presents the estimates from a nested logit regression that predicts the unconditional probability of choosing a 
payment method and, conditional on the payment method choice, the probability of opting for a particular source of financing. 
The first stage is the decision on the mode of payment. The second stage is the choice of financing sources conditional on the 
payment method. The sample comprises 1,361 acquisitions. Variable definitions are given in Appendix I. The Chi-square statistic 
on the significance of the overall is significant at the 0.0001% level. a/b/c stand for statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% 
level, respectively.  
 
 First stage: Second stage: 
 Choice of the payment method Choice of the means of financing 
Conditional on the payment method 













DEBT and EQ. Financing 
(vs. CASH and EQUITY 
Financing) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Coeff. Pr > |t| Coeff. Pr > |t| Coeff. Pr > |t| Coeff. Pr > |t| Coeff. Pr > |t| 
           
INTERCEPT  3.14
b .012 -5.36b .036 4.01c .064 -15.10a .004 -3.48 .465 
Cost of Capital (CC1). Pecking Order and Market Timing: 
CFLOW/TRANSVAL 0.02 .361 -0.04
b .017 0.17a .006 0.05 .482 -0.17a .006 
COLLATERAL 1.36 .207 0.26 .856 -0.65 .537 0.71
c .058 2.74b .032 




b .027 -0.18 .510 -1.12b .018 -0.04 .764 -1.73b .060 
1997-1999 -0.08 .714 -0.39 .544 -0.30 .588 -0.76 .625 0.06 .957 
2000-2001 0.21 .306 -0.05 .787 1.08 .335 1.17
c .053 1.15c .086 
Cost of Capital (CC2). Regulatory Environment: 
SH PRT x RULAW -0.04 .611 -0.02 .524 -0.12
b .014 -0.15c .072 0.08 .506 
CR PRT x RULAW -0.01 .983 0.01 .806 0.07 .729 0.36
b .021 0.08 .303 
TRANSP x RULAW -0.05 .222 -0.07 .141 -0.04 .460 -0.02 .533 0.02 .755 
Agency Costs (AG1). Agency Cost of Equity and Takeover Threat: 
BLOCKHLDR>20     -0.42 .505 0.63 .349 0.34 .589 
TO THREAT     -2.16 .560 -4.04 .708 -2.62 .316 
Agency Costs (AG2). Debt Overhang and AG3. Agency Cost of Debt and Financial Flexibility: 
Q-RATIO     -0.08 .127 -0.12 .300 -0.22
b .046 
BETA     1.14 .451 1.52
c .087 -0.81 .634 
AGE                            0.01 .402 0.06 .256 0.00 .905 
Means of Payment (MP1). Risk Sharing: 
MVAL (log) -0.11 .226 -0.08 .356 -0.23
a
 .008 0.16 .158 0.52a .002 
RELVAL  -4.14
a .000 -2.27b .011 -3.10 .504 -1.62 .363 2.56c .064 
Means of Payment (MP2). The Threat of Control Change: 
CONTROL THREAT 0.05 .387 0.08 .163 -0.08 .562 0.17 .446 -0.15 .588 
20<CONTROL<60 3.28
b .028 1.17 .518 0.50 .255 -0.26 .724 0.22 .630 
CONTROL<20 1.74
b .039 -0.51 .730       
Means of Payment (MP3). Characteristics of Acquisition: 
CROSSBORDER BID 0.29
a .000 -0.42 .405 -0.38 .412 -0.53 .214 -2.69b .017 
TENDER OFFER 0.15 .544 -0.07 .789 -0.45 .207 0.77 .749 0.89 .450 
HOSTILE BID 1.24
b .031 0.86c .074 0.41 .443 0.48 .338 -1.24 .315 
LISTED TARGET -0.69
a .000 -0.97c .083 0.35 .675 1.02 .160 -1.30 .418 
INTRA-IND BID -0.24 .356 -0.17 .536 -0.09 .557 -0.34 .751 -0.08 .954 
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Table 5. Cumulative average abnormal returns for bidding firms by sources of financing 
 
Table reports the average values of the CARs for bidding firms classified by sources of financing. Variable definitions are given 
in Appendix I. Abnormal returns are computed as the difference between the realized and market model benchmark returns. For 
each firm we calculate daily benchmark returns using MSCI-Europe index returns and the market model parameters are estimated 
over 240 days starting 300 days prior to the acquisition announcement. A non-parametric test (Corrado, 1989) is used to assess 
the significance of the CAARs. a/b/c stand for statistical significance at 1%/5%/10%, respectively. 
 
 Pre-announcement period 
[-60, -2] 
Announcement period  
[-1, +1] 




 CAARs % (t-stat) CAARs % (t-stat) CAARs % (t-stat)  
        
All Sources of Financing: 1.08 (1.47) 0.77a (3.15) -3.11a (-5.45) 1361 
 Cash payment 1.04 (1.20) 0.94a (3.87) -2.21a (-3.85) 854 
 Mixed (Cash-and-Equity) payment -0.73 (-1.24) 1.09a (2.84) -4.11a (-5.51) 259 
 Equity payment 3.09a (3.37) -0.16 (-0.18) -5.15a (-7.12) 248 
        
Diff. Cash Pmt  – Mixed Pmt 1.77
a
 (2.78) -0.15 (-1.21) 1.90a (4.32)  
Diff. Cash Pmt – Equity Pmt -2.05a (-3.71) 1.10a (3.29) 2.94a (6.00)  
        
        
Cash Financing: 0.42 (0.62) 0.79a (3.60) -1.35 a (-2.95) 590 
 Cash payment 0.42 (0.62) 0.79a (3.60) -1.35 a (-2.95) 590 
        
Debt Financing: 1.92b (1.99) 1.32a (4.12) -0.28 (-1.38) 173 
 Cash payment 1.92b (1.99) 1.32a (4.12) -0.28 (-1.38) 173 
        
Debt & Equity Financing: -1.85a (-2.54) 1.10a (3.02) -3.14a (-4.62) 139 
 Cash payment 2.64a (2.72) 0.81a (2.88) -4.52a (-3.22) 42 
 Mixed (Cash-and-Equity) payment -3.82a (-3.34) 1.22a (3.40) -1.09a (-4.13) 97 
        
Equity Financing: 1.87a (3.11) 0.49a (2.84) -5.73a (-7.05a) 459 
 Cash payment 2.66a (3.14) 1.21a (2.64) -6.25a (-3.11a) 49 
 Mixed (Cash-and-Equity) payment 0.42 (0.34) 1.01a (2.76) -4.91a (-5.77a) 162 
 Equity payment 3.09a (3.37) -0.16 (-0.18) -5.15a (-3.12a) 248 
Diff. Cash Pmt  – Mixed Pmt 2.24a (4.11) 0.20 (1.36) -1.34a (-4.12a)  
Diff. Cash Pmt – Equity Pmt -0.43a (-2.66) 1.37a (4.05) -1.10a (-5.23a)  
        
        
Diff. Cash Fin  – Debt Fin -1.50a (-3.33) -0.53 b (-2.18) -1.07a (-4.03)  
Diff. Cash Fin  – Debt & Equity Fin 2.27b (2.05) -0.31 (-1.58) 1.79a (4.86)  
Diff. Cash Fin  – Equity Fin -1.45a (-3.40) 0.30c (1.93) 4.38a (8.01)  






Table 6. The valuation effect of the financing choice: multivariate analysis 
 
This table reports the results of the OLS regressions of the bidder CARs for three different event windows and for the subsamples of all-cash and mixed offers. Variable definitions 
are given in Appendix I. For each variable, we list the regression coefficient normalized by its standard deviation (except for binary variables). As such, each number in the table 
indicates the incremental change in the analysed CARs (%) associated with a particular takeover characteristic (binary variables) or with a one-standard deviation change in the 
reference variable (level variables). The statistically significant effects are denoted in bold. Statistical significance is indicated by the heteroskedasticity-consistent p-value. a/b/c stand 
for statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level, respectively. 
 
 WHOLE SAMPLE CASH PAYMENT MIXED PAYMENT 
 CAR [-60, -2] CAR [-1, +1] CAR [+2, +60] CAR [-60, -2] CAR [-1, +1] CAR [+2, +60] CAR [-60, -2] CAR [-1, +1] CAR [+2, +60] 
 Effect p-val Effect p-val Effect p-val Effect p-val Effect p-val Effect p-val Effect p-val Effect p-val Effect p-val 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
                   
EQUITY PMT / EQTY FIN 1.56 b .042  -0.69 c .257 -3.34 .137             
CASH PMT / EQTY FIN 2.03 .603 0.88 .305 -6.04 c .067  3.55 .358 0.42 .611 -7.85 b .022        
CASH PMT / DEBT FIN 1.06 .731 1.10 .163 3.02 .257 2.22 .481 0.85 .202 1.73 .135       
MIX PMT / DEBT FIN -6.72 b .015b 0.89 .275 1.82 .552       -7.75 a .004  0.96 .362 5.46 .160 
CROSSBORDER BID -2.97 .272 -1.12 .136 -2.61 .166 -1.02 .669 -0.41 .415 -3.40 .107 2.80 .670 -2.00 .150 -1.10 .862 
HOSTILE BID 8.74 a .004 -1.64 b .034  -3.98 .322 3.33 b .031  -0.83 .458 -3.44 .465 15.20 b .037  -4.31 c .095c -6.35 .430 
TENDER OFFER 2.22 .608 -2.67 .005  -2.65 .337 -3.63 .346 -0.59 .467 0.41 .906 12.50 .212 -3.89 c .067  -0.64 .941 
LISTED TARGET -1.27 .759 0.36 .650 1.03 .773 1.32 .705 0.38 .607 3.07 .354 -3.22 .747 -0.05 .980 3.76 .547 
INTRA-IND BID -1.39 .181 -0.25 .520 0.57 .794 -2.44 .304 -0.42 .397 1.94 .351 -0.21 .968 -0.28 .767 -1.28 .704 
1997-1999 1.61 c .057c 1.61 c .051  -4.89 a .010  4.71 b .011  0.98 c .082  -3.48 .140 -1.31 .794 1.04 .325 -4.33 b .014  
2000-2001 4.49 c .054  -0.09 .919 -13.97 a .000  3.37 .268 0.87 .177 -9.57 a .000  5.83 .125 -0.31 .802 -15.78 a .000  
CFLOW/TA -3.92 a .002  -0.04 .913 2.35 b .035  -8.42 a .000  0.41 .223 2.20 c .087  0.44 .873 0.22 .811 2.37 .347 
Q-RATIO 0.38 .751 0.06 .847 -4.94 a .000  1.68 .265 -0.13 .725 -6.32 a .000  2.48 .301 -0.17 .876 -5.79 a .010  
LEVERAGE -2.18 c .081c 0.37 .273 1.27 .242 -0.92 .527 -0.06 .846 -0.68 .549 -5.08 c .059  1.68 c .063  2.94 .235 
TOEHOLD -0.51 .677 0.24 .474 1.67 .144 -0.07 .961 0.50 c .095  2.27 .039  -1.19 .533 -0.34 .586 1.97 .216 
RUNUP    1.12 .000  2.55 a .000    1.35 a .000  1.34 a .000    1.78 .093  3.70 a .000  
                   
N obs. 1361  1361  1361  854  854  854  259  259  259  
Adjusted-R2 3.85  6.69  27.09  7.95  5.22  23.75  11.43  10.47  30.97  
F-value 2.59 a .000  7.33 a .000  33.84 a .000  3.28 a .000  4.14 a .000  18.78 a .000  2.85 a .001  5.02 a .000  16.43 a .000  
 
